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Introduction
Political economy is a discipline that studies the combined and inter-
acting effects of economic and political structures and, by extension,
deals with the broader political implications on local, national and
international economic behavior. Formerly, classical economists used
the term political economy synonymously with what we call now main-
stream economics. Hence, classical political economists assumed eco-
nomic decisions are made on the basis of the political sphere. There-
fore, in a context in which economic policies were not perceived as
being separate from politics, the concept of political economy referred
to the economic policies of nation states. The question how does pol-
itics shape economic outcomes? has been asked since the seventeenth
century.1
Starting from the nineteenth century, the terminology and con-
cept of political economy was broadened to encompass the manifold
ways through which political factors at local, national and interna-
1Classical political economists of that period, including Adam Smith, David
Ricardo, Richard Malthus, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx among others, were
concerned about how the economy would be determined by the political structures
of the society (Barnes, 1995).
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6 Introduction
tional levels are vital in determining economic outcomes. However,
around this time, -in the late nineteenth century - the term political
economy stopped serving as a synonym for mainstream economics in
the general discourse (Besley, 2007).
It is interesting to note that during the first half of the twenti-
eth century, scholars in mainstream economics tended to deemphasize
the role of contextual factors such as political, institutional and other
social influences while stressing rigor, analytical coherence, and expla-
nations of economic trends (Baumol, 2000). By contrast, during the
second half of the twentieth century, experiences with policy reforms in
developing countries, as well as the multiplication of policy failures of
the post-cold war period, triggered the need to integrate insights from
other social sciences, to ensure a more productive interaction with the
policy-making process (Csaba, 2005). Beginning in the early 1970s, an
increasing number of economists have turned their attention to the old
question (how does politics affect the economic outcome? ) and exerted
a significant amount of effort not only to demonstrate that political
power influences on economic outcome, but also to assess its role in
determining that influence (Drazen, 2002). The extensive amount of
work conducted along this line has been done over many years and
under a variety of names, prominent among which have been public
choice, rent-seeking, and, most recently, new institutional economics.
The pioneers include Downs (1957), North (1981), Buchanan and Tolli-
son (1984), Tullock (1988), and Olson (1993) whose work has attracted
increasing attention from economists specializing in more traditional
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areas. As a consequence of all these efforts, political economy has be-
come a component of mainstream economics (Findlay, 1990; Besley,
2007). Furthermore, these efforts lay down the groundwork in modern
neoclassical economics literature for an approach that is known as the
new political economy.
Later on in the evolution of economics, the new political econ-
omy has developed to become an essential subject area to denote how
the political nature of decision making or political affairs affects pol-
icy choices and, eventually, economic outcomes. The new political
economy, consisting of a mixture of rationalist politics, public choice,
institutions and policy analysis, is largely described in the literature in
terms of its use of the formal and technical tools of modern analysis to
highlight the importance of politics for economics and/or vice-versa.2
So, what is the new political economy? For our purpose, we can gener-
ally describe it as the study of the interaction of politics and economics
and, ultimately, the political nature of decision making which affects
economic choices in a society (i.e., social groups, firms, organizations or
countries). The new political economy as an approach does not ques-
tion the validity of the insights and relevance of mainstream economic
theories (Csaba, 2005). Instead it seeks to integrate economic theories
in policy-relevant insights. In Timothy Besley’s words (Besley, 2007,
pp. 585-586):
2Contemporary economics is not only used as a mathematical approach but also
conceptually, by studying political phenomena related to optimization, incentives,
constraints, etc. (Drazen, 2002).
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8 Introduction
“The New Political Economy occasionally engages in de-
bates about grand issues such as the role of states versus
markets and the differences between democracy and autoc-
racy. However, a lot of the work is focused on how the
institutional details of political structure matter for pol-
icy outcomes ‘in the small’. The New Political Economy
rises to specific challenges. At a broad level, it is look-
ing behind the institutions that generate policy outcomes.
While this occasionally results in a more conservative ap-
praisal of the capacity for government intervention, it also
gives a way of thinking about how to make government in-
tervention more effective. The New Political Economy is
not about economic imperialism. The aim is to generate
new, policy-relevant insights, particularly in areas where
economists may have a comparative advantage. What we
learn complements rather than substitutes knowledge gen-
erated in other branches of the social sciences. [...There-
fore,] the New Political Economy is about expanding the
domain of economic policy analysis and hence enhancing
its relevance.”
The new political economy, as articulated above, is the subject
matter of this study, but it is emphatically not confined to the po-
litical economy in the literal sense of the political game, like theo-
retical eclecticism or political resource allocation. Our main interest
is to shed light on how political factors influence economic outcomes,
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Introduction 9
and how economic conditions in turn determine political consequences.
Thus, the primary focus of the current work is investigating the combi-
nation of economic and political factors that shape the characteristics
of the political economy of countries. In this study, we consider some
of these frontier topics- conflict, migration, and institutions.
In regard to methodology, the new political economy borrows ideas
from modern mainstream economics in large part through its use of for-
mal and technical analysis tools. As a result, methodologically, the new
political economy can be broadly classified into two major categories:
(i) the theoretical category, which determines a political economy equi-
librium by shaping the main economic and political ideas in the formal
sense of mathematical modeling as well as analytically verification;
and (ii) the empirical category, which econometrically confronts the
theory with relevant data. The present work seeks to offer an in-depth
empirical analysis of selected political-economic issues, such as so-
cial heterogeneity, civil conflicts, international migration, and political
institutions.
Heterogeneity of interests is considered as the basis of economics,
and an economy certainly embraces conflicting interests among dif-
ferent individuals or groups. The academic discourse recognizes that
heterogeneity plays a critical role in the economy. More particularly,
heterogeneity of agents, markets, tests, endowments, expectations etc.,
understood to be essential elements, appropriately addresses the sub-
ject matter itself (Kirman, 2006; Gatti et al., 2012; Becker, 2017). Like-
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10 Introduction
wise, heterogeneity of interests is undoubtedly one of central themes
of much of the discussion in the field of the new political economy.
Drazen (2002) describes in great detail the importance of heterogeneity
for political economy as summarized in the following two propositions
(Drazen, 2002, pp.10).
“First, heterogeneity or conflict of interests is necessary
for there to be political constraints. Second, the effect
of politics on economics follows from the mechanisms by
which these conflicts are resolved. The first point is clear-
heterogeneity is a necessary condition. It can be read as
saying only that without heterogeneity, there would be
nothing to study. It is the second which is really [...] de-
fines political economy. Heterogeneity is also necessary for
there to be markets, but heterogeneity of interests plays
out quite differently when addressed through the market
than through the political process. For example, the ef-
fect of heterogeneity of abilities on a distribution of income
mediated simply through the market will be quite different
than the income distribution which would result when in-
dividuals can lobby for transfers, based on their endowed
abilities. How much different will depend on the politi-
cal mechanism by which tax-and-transfer policy is decided.
Moreover, there are numerous issues where individuals have
heterogeneity of interests where the market mechanism ei-
ther cannot be used or simply is not used to determine
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outcomes, the political choice mechanism being used in-
stead”.
In addition to the factors addressed, social heterogeneity is also a
significant factor in relation to the political economy of countries (Col-
lier and Hoeffler, 1998; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2017). The current
work offers a conceptual framework and quantitative analysis of the
impacts of cultural heterogeneity as it relates to international market
shocks to the export of primary products, and the probability of civil
conflict in the developing countries. In this study we aim to show
that there is indeed a strong correlation between social heterogeneity
and the likelihood of civil wars relating to exogenous economic shocks.
The analysis also seeks to go beyond demonstrating the links between
market shocks and conflicts and attempts to reflect the effects of cul-
tural diversity within the political economy of the sample countries
(Chapter 1).
Social heterogeneity and civil conflicts at the national or local levels
have further repercussions on the international political economy atmo-
sphere. International migration, in this regard, can be understood as
a coping strategy that follows changes–positive or negative (or both)-
at the national or local level of the political economy. These changes
depend on a broad range of factors such as security regimes, ethnic
structures, governance and social networks, institutions, and access
to resources (i.e., land, water, food, road, markets etc.) As Collinson
(2009) suggests, major changes, and transformations at the national or
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12 Introduction
local level–including economic growth, market shocks, political crises,
intra-state conflicts and/or inter-state conflicts, environmental hazards
and other disasters– can transform national political economies, while
people in the society are confronted with the opportunities and con-
straints that these changes bring. The latter effect becomes more pro-
nounced when the changes in the political economy leave people in the
society worse off and with no choice but to adapt their behavior and
livelihoods to minimize the new risks. International migration, can
therefore, be taken as one such survival or coping strategy. Further-
more, this author remarks:
“[...] Specific patterns of migration are determined to a
large extent by the particular interaction of individual or
household livelihood strategies with a range of social, eco-
nomic and political relationships, processes, institutions,
and structures that make up the (historical) context in
which these strategies are pursued. Migration itself rep-
resents a key process through which many communities
are connected to the wider political economy, and the na-
ture of migration experiences and relationships for differ-
ent households and communities may be crucial for deter-
mining whether this connection is, on balance, adverse or
positive for their overall livelihoods and wellbeing at a par-
ticular point in time” (Collinson, 2009, pp. 8).
Focusing more specifically on migration patterns from Africa to Eu-
rope, the current work also empirically examines the political economy
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HETEROGENEITY, MIGRATION, AND INSTITUTIONS 
Yitagesu Zewdu  Zergawu 
 
Introduction 13
factors of international migrations trends. In particular, the study at-
tempts to understand the complexities of intercontinental migration
dynamics at the level of the international political economy, as well
as being concerned with the broader human security perspective that
combines economic and political contexts (Chapter2).
One of the central themes in the new political economy is deal-
ing with the theoretical and empirical implications of institutional ar-
rangements for making political choices (Besley, 2007). After North
(1981) revealed the fundamental role institutions play in framing eco-
nomic outcomes, there is now greater acceptance among economists
that, generally, the quality of institutions really matters. In particu-
lar Acemoglu et al. (2005) argue that “good institutions” are essential
conditions and factors that make countries richer or poorer, since in-
stitutions play a significant role for economic growth by shaping the
incentives of principal actors in society.
This study also deals with the importance of institutional qual-
ity in the new political economy framework by seeking to determine
how political institutions contribute to economic growth in relation
to infrastructure capital (Chapter3). Indeed, institutional indicator
variables are taken as essential determinants of the subject matter of
political economy throughout the discussion presented in the current
document.
This document is divided into four chapters, which are laid out be-
low (note that each chapter is independent of the others, and therefore,
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includes its own introduction and a conclusion).
Chapter 1 analyzes the impacts of social heterogeneity and exoge-
nous economic shocks on the probability of civil conflicts. To this
end, it is necessary to address central concerns including whether or
not exogenous economic shocks promote civil conflicts directly and if
they affect all societies alike. Hence, this chapter uses an extensive
panel data sample to empirically investigate the joint impact of pri-
mary commodity export price shocks and social heterogeneity, ethnic
and religious polarization and fractionalization on civil conflicts and
wars. The key finding in the chapter is that in ethnically polarized
societies, commodity export price shocks increase the probability of
political instability. On the other hand, the effect of commodity export
price shocks on civil conflicts depends on the type of income shocks and
category of commodity in ethnically and religiously fractionalized (as
well as religiously polarized) societies. Put simply; exogenous economic
shocks affect the political stability of countries differently depending
on pre-existing social structures, types of price shocks and categories
of products.
Chapter 2 presents the political economy of international migration
trends. Taking into consideration the contemporary phenomena of mi-
gration from Africa into Epurope, this chapter examines the crucial
role that civil conflicts and other political factors play in determining
patterns of migrations. To this end the chapter takes into account
numerous variables of human security, including political instability,
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HETEROGENEITY, MIGRATION, AND INSTITUTIONS 
Yitagesu Zewdu  Zergawu 
 
Introduction 15
economic growth, social heterogeneity, and political institutions, to
reveal potential push and pull factors. Accordingly, in this chapter
we empirically analyze the determinants of regular and asylum seeker
migration flows from Africa to Europe over a significant time period.
The main findings of the chapter illustrate that beyond economic de-
terminants, factors such as increased political persecution, ethnic ten-
sion, human rights violations, political instability and civil conflicts in
African source countries are all significantly associated with increased
migration flows into European destination countries. Based on these
findings, we suggest, as a policy recommendation, that European coun-
tries need to engage with countries of origin to overcome the current
migration and refugee crisis in Europe.
Next, Chapter 3 looks at the political economy of institutions, par-
ticularly focusing on the role institutions play in relation to factors
of production and growth. The empirical strategy we employ in this
chapter involves estimating a simple growth model where, in addition
to standard controls, infrastructure capital and institutional quality, as
well as the interaction of these components, are included as explana-
tory variables. Taking into consideration the potential problems of es-
timating growth models, we seek to deal with firm additive unobserved
heterogeneity that may cause endogeneity by applying a dynamic panel
model approach. The findings of this chapter confirm that the inter-
action terms between infrastructure capital and political institutions
have a positive and significant impact on economic growth.
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Finally, Chapter 4 aims to show the return impact of emigrants on
political stability and institutional quality in their home countries. It
is noteworthy that migration contributes to the flow of goods, skills,
knowledge, information, ideas and financial capital. Similarly, inter-
national migration is also an essential determinate for the process of
economic development and political changes. Several possible factors
could determine the nature and direction of emigrant involvement in
relation to homeland political stability and enhancing or insuring insti-
tutional qualities. In this chapter, we study the effect of emigrants on
the political sphere in the home state by examining the phenomenon
of emigrant–activism and taking into consideration channels of the
information transfer and cultural diffusion. To this end, we use cross–
sectional and panel estimation techniques for a large sample of African
countries as states of origin and OECD countries as destination coun-
tries.
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Chapter 1
The impact of social
heterogeneity and
commodity price shocks on
civil conflicts1
Overview. Do exogenous economic shocks promote civil conflicts di-
rectly? Do they affect all societies alike? The current study presents a
large sample panel data evidence not only on the effect of commodity
export price shocks on conflict incidence, rather than onsets, but also
on the joint impact of both ethnic and religious polarization and frac-
tionalization on political instability. In this regard, we find out that
in ethnically polarized societies, the commodity export price shocks
increase violence. Nonetheless, in ethnically and religiously fractional-
1The results of this chapter have been published at Journal of Policy Modelling.
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18 Chapter 1: Price shocks on civil conflicts
ized societies (as well as religiously polarized), the effect of commodity
export price shocks on civil conflicts depends on the type of income
shocks and category of commodity. These findings contribute to the
existing literature by illuminating the compound effect of both income
shocks and social diversity on intrastate conflicts.
Keywords: economic shocks; conflict; ethnicity; religion; polariza-
tion; fractonalization, commodity price.
1.1 Introduction
As Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015) point out, civil conflicts (in-
trastate turmoil, ranging from an anti-government mass demonstration
and general strikes to violent riots and civil wars) have become one of
a common phenomenon throughout the world, particularly in devel-
oping countries. Indeed, there were 150 large civil wars between 1945
and 2013. The consequences of such conflicts include mass fatality, de-
molition of the natural environment, physical infrastructures, human
capital, and social and political institutions (Blattman and Miguel,
2010).
One of the key factors behind domestic conflicts is economic situa-
tion (see Miguel et al., 2004; Bazzi and Blattman, 2014; and Musayev
et al., 2014, among others). Specifically, undesirable economic circum-
stances may aggravate ongoing conflicts or initiate a new episode of
conflict incidents (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).
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There are a large number of studies that examine the impact of
income shocks on civil conflicts. These studies measure the income
shocks through the variability of primary commodity export prices in
the global market. This may be due to the fact that (i) the export
price index is not affected by the actions of an individual country, and,
(ii) the primary commodity prices are more volatile than manufactured
commodities (Varangis et al., 2004; Ciarli and Di Maio, 2013; Kinda
et al., 2016). Therefore, since the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
developing countries are predominantly dependent on a few primary
commodities, slight price changes on such commodities will affect their
economic and political performances.2
Notwithstanding these actual facts, the literature does not provide
us with a standardized and unique relationship between the economic
shocks and domestic conflicts. Particularly, the theoretical determi-
nants of price shocks on civil conflicts may be placed loosely in three
channels: the opportunity cost of fighting, the weakness and fragility
of state, and the state as a prize. It is noteworthy that through these
channels both negative and positive commodity export price shocks
may affect civil wars.
From the opportunity cost of fighting point of view, Collier and
Hoeffler (2004) and Miguel et al. (2004) provide cross-country evidence
about the negative relationship between growth shocks and the risk
2The primary products account for about half, on average, of developing coun-
tries’ export earnings, and many developing countries derive the bulk of their export
earnings from one or two commodities (Cashin et al., 1999).
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HETEROGENEITY, MIGRATION, AND INSTITUTIONS 
Yitagesu Zewdu  Zergawu 
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of civil war. They argue that wages represent the opportunity cost
of insurrection, assuming that conflict and production are alternative
choices (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, among others).
From the perspective of the weakness and fragility of state, Fearon
and Laitin (2003); Brinkerhoff (2005); Brückner and Ciccone (2010)
and Dube and Vargas (2013) analyze the difficulties of the state to
control the territory that pursue from downturns in the international
price of main export commodities. Specifically, they find out that
price shocks are followed by the outbreak of civil wars in developing
countries.
Alternatively, Besley and Persson (2008) and Bazzi and Blattman
(2014) consider the reward motivation point of view, that is, they
study the state as a prize. In this scenario, they hypothesise that the
higher the prices of exported commodities, the greater the likelihood
of internal conflict.
Besides the aforementioned economic factors, identity-based social
intolerance (i.e., ethnic or religious hostilities) also plays a central role
in civil conflicts, especially in socially heterogeneous countries (Caselli
and Coleman, 2013; Mitra and Ray, 2014). The struggle for control
of economic resources among different interest groups may trigger ei-
ther inter-ethnic or inter-religious grievances. In this regard, Fearon
and Laitin (2003) identify that between 1945 and 1999, about 51%
of civil wars originated by way of ethnic conflicts. Thus, ethnically
and religious fragmented (i.e., diverse) societies promote more conflicts
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than social groups characterized by class diversity (Ganepola and Tha-
laysingam, 2004; Lujala et al., 2005; Weinstein, 2006; Blattman and
Miguel, 2010). Accordingly, Esteban and Ray (2016) further argue
that a “substantial share of conflict can take place in economically
similar groups. Even though the conflict is over economic resources,
the deriving cleavage is non-material hence it is social identity”.
In this regard, although several papers study the effects of ethnolin-
guistic and/or religious diversity on civil conflicts and economic growth
(see for instance, Alesina et al., 2003; Forsberg, 2008; Desmet et al.,
2012; Esteban et al., 2012; Papyrakis and Raveh, 2014), the joint im-
pact of income shocks and social diversity is less analyzed. Recently,
Bazzi and Blattman (2014), using price shocks to 65 globally traded
commodities and 118 developing countries from 1957 to 2007, find no
evidence linking commodity price shocks to conflicts in ethnically po-
larized countries. On the contrary, Janus and Riera-Crichton (2015),
using six categories of export commodities and import price shocks
for 160 countries from 1970 to 2009, find a correlation between ethnic
polarization and onset of civil war.3
By focusing on the group’s identity, which plays a key role in trig-
gering civil conflicts where the social heterogeneity is conspicuous, we
3Bazzi and Blattman (2014) and Janus and Riera-Crichton (2015) differ due to
(i) the lagged values: while the former tested the effects of commodity price shocks
during one year and the two preceding years, the latter test price shocks using the
three preceding years; and, (ii) the level of ethnic diversity: Bazzi and Blattman
(2014) studied the effects of price shocks in ethnically polarized countries, but
not in countries with intermediate ethnic diversity, which is covered by Janus and
Riera-Crichton (2015).
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analyze the influence of price shocks on civil conflicts. To the best of
our knowledge, the current approach is the first attempt to consider
thoroughly, both ethnic and religious diversity to discuss the influence
of commodity export price shocks on civil conflicts. Furthermore, this
study uses alternative measures, which makes the price shock indices
stationary and removes predictable elements from the stationary pro-
cess (Kinda et al., 2016). The common approach uses the change in
price as a metric for shocks by a time-invariant measure of the im-
portance of commodity prices in the economy. Such approach does
not account for the potential trend related to price changes (widely
discussed in Subsection 1.4.2).
Unlike the aforementioned literature, our analysis focuses on an in-
dicator of the incidence of civil conflict rather than the onset of civil
conflict to observe effects of commodity export price shocks and social
diversities on political instability. Conflict incidence is a more compre-
hensive index that measures the outbreak of a new episode of conflict or
the continuation of existing conflict. Furthermore, the onset of conflict
measure presents some limitations (see Section 1.4 for further discus-
sion). For instance, although Bazzi and Blattman (2014) argue that
conflict onset and continuation follow different processes, and so should
be treated differently, Bleaney and Dimico (2011) defend that includ-
ing both measures is an overstatement, since these concepts presents
very few theoretical differences. Additionally, from a theoretical point
of view, our study is framed in the context of grievance: civil conflict
is precipitated by the exclusion of certain religious or ethnic groups
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from political power, or by economic inequality (Bleaney and Dimico,
2011). Empirical studies, such as Fearon and Laitin (2003), tend to
find that proxies for grievance have little predictive power for the onset
of civil war. Consequently, we only use the incidence of civil conflict
to overcome the onset civil conflict limitations.
Specifically, our analysis yields the following three findings. Firstly,
we observe that the effects of commodity export price shocks and social
diversities are more robust on the outbreak of civil conflict incidences.
Hence, using both aggregated and disaggregated commodities, we find
out significant relationships between civil conflicts incidences and price
shocks coupled with social heterogeneity. Furthermore, these results
remain valid in case of conflict intensity, civil war, specific to conflict
prone countries and regions, and different income level countries.
Secondly, we observe that the effect of income shocks on civil con-
flicts has different patterns, which is determined by the type of shocks,
the nature of social diversity, and the classification of the commod-
ity (either of labor intensive or capital intensive). We find out that
positive price shocks increase the probability of insurgency civil con-
flict risks in more ethnically polarized societies. On the other hand, the
likelihood of violence decreases with ethnically and religiously fraction-
alized (as well as religiously polarized) societies, when we analyze the
overall income shocks. However, with these social structures, negative
price shocks, increase the chance of civil conflicts. We also find out
that the decline of household income and government revenue is fol-
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lowed by conflict incidences in religiously diverse societies. Therefore,
this result justifies that both capital and labour intensive commodities
price shocks affect civil conflicts.
Finally, although Bazzi and Blattman (2014) provide no empirical
evidence between war or coups and the state as a prize point of view,
we find out significant and robust positive correlations between the
positive commodity export shocks and conflict. This result confirms
that the state prize channel remains valid in analyzing price shocks
and political instability.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Sections 1.2
and 1.3 deal with the measures of social heterogeneity and the the-
oretical framework, respectively. Section 1.4 describes the empirical
approach. Section 1.5 presents the main results and examines robust-
ness along several dimensions. Section 1.6 offers a conclusion. Finally,
Section 1.7 presents technical specifications and additional regression
results.
1.2 Social diversity and conflict
In the casual relationship between economy and conflict, the existence
of large inequalities in resource distribution generates social tensions
and political unrest. This fact holds to be true for both developing and
developed economies. In addition, in the case of developing countries,
social identity serves as a structural foundation for potential group for-
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mation and social conflicts. However, a conceptual understanding of
social diversity may diverge according to the differences among indi-
viduals we consider, such as by ethnicity, race, gender, language, and
religion. Among all of these social group formations, ethnic, linguistic,
religious, or cultural identities are usually attached to social fragmen-
tation and civil conflicts. Indeed, as Reynal-Querol (2002) notes, coun-
tries with high ethnic and religious cleavages are more vulnerable to
being involved in intense conflict than those countries with conflicting
claims on resources. Recent statistical evidence on civil wars also con-
firms that more than half of the civil conflicts in the post-World War
II were related with ethnic fragmentation (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).
Therefore, the likelihood of civil conflict increases with exogenous eco-
nomic shocks, especially in ethnically and religiously fragmented soci-
eties.
This social diversity is measured by mean of two indices, mainly:
the fractionalization and polarization indices. These indices have been
used as explanatory variables in several empirical analysis, including
politics, and governance studies (Easterly and Levine, 1997; La Porta
et al., 1999); studies of economic growth (Garćıa Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol, 2002; Alesina et al., 2003; Papyrakis and Raveh, 2014; Mon-
talvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005); as well as ethnic conflict researches
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Campos and Kuzeyev, 2007; Forsberg, 2008;
Bhavnani and Miodownik, 2009; Desmet et al., 2012 Esteban et al.,
2012).
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The fractionalization index FRAC is the classical measure of
social diversity. The FRAC originates with Hirschman (1964), and it
deals with the likelihood that two randomly chosen people will be a
part of different groups. Formally, if tn1, n2, ......nmu denotes the share










which can be interpreted as the probability of selecting two indi-
viduals at random with different ethnic (or religious) groups.
To show how conflictual a society is, Esteban and Ray (1994) in-
troduced the polarization index P, which is based on the inter-group









Unlike fractionalization, the polarization index measures the exis-
tence of deep cleavages in a society. The polarization index attains its
maximum value when the population is divided into two equal-sized
group at some maximum distance from each other, while the fraction-
alization index obtains its maximum value when every individual has
his or her own group, and each group is different from the rest (Esteban
and Ray, 2011).
In the current approach, we use the RQ polarization measure
proposed by Garćıa Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002), where the
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inter-group distance is binary, i.e., dij=1 if i ‰ j and 0 otherwise. In
doing so, polarization is characterized by the normalized distance of a






n2i p1´ niq. (1.3)
As Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) argue, in order to compute
the ethnic or religious P index, the distances among all different ethnic
or religious groups has to be computed, which will be a very difficult
process. Hence, with the RQ index, Garćıa Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2002) propose that we assume the absolute distance between
two groups is equal.
Finally, it is noteworthy that there are a multitude of contextual us-
ages of these distributional indexes in the body of literature. Esteban
and Ray (1994, 1999) studied, through the polarization index, the link
between the level and pattern of social conflict (such as the generation
of social tensions, revolution, and revolt or social unrest in general)
with the distribution of a set of characteristics (such as wealth, eth-
nicity, religion, and political ideology) over a population. Easterly and
Levine (1997) show that ethnic diversity has a direct negative effect
on economic growth. Social polarization reduces the security of prop-
erty and contract rights and, through this channel, reduces growth
Keefer and Knack (2002). Similarly, using alternative data, Alesina
et al. (2003), confirm that as there is a negative correlation between
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ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization and economic growth,
quality of government and policies, and GDP per capita. Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol (2005) present empirical evidence that ethnic and
religious polarization has a significant and negative effect on economic
development. Woo (2005) shows how a fiscal instability channel nega-
tively links social polarization and growth. Other studies reinforce the
direct relation of polarization with income inequality, social diversity,
and generation of social tensions (see Seshanna and Decornez, 2003;
Duclos et al., 2004; Wang and Wan, 2015, among others). Likewise,
Campos and Kuzeyev (2007) also find that dynamic ethnic fractional-
ization is negatively related to economic growth. Desmet et al. (2012)
point that the deeply-rooted linguistic cleavages may limit the inte-
gration of markets, and prevent economic growth. Furthermore, social
polarization and horizontal social inequality are positively related to
conflict outbreak (Østby, 2008). Esteban and Ray (2011) also obtain
a positive result that both ethnic and religious polarization have a
significant effect on conflict.
1.3 The theoretical model
The current approach analyses conflict as the outcome of group di-
versification based on a pre-existing identity that may provoke by
contemporary exogenous economic events. In this context, the po-
larization and fractionalization distributional measures are the most
widely used indexes in the study of identity-based conflicts. Ethnic
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and religious fractionalization and polarisation measures are the main
analytical frameworks of this chapter. The presentation of the theo-
retical proposition in this section is based on Esteban and Ray (2011)
and Esteban et al. (2012). This conflict incidence theory analyses how
the equilibrium level of conflict is achieved using a behavioural model.
Indeed, the group distribution plays a key role. A population is thus
distributed over m groups and engaged in conflict, with Ni the number
of individuals in group i and N the total number of individuals. The
conflicting groups are assumed to contest to seize public (non-rivalry
and non-excludable) and private (rivalry and excludable) payoffs.
Furthermore, Esteban et al. (2012) elucidate the types and natures
of the two payoffs:
• The private prizes for the winning group offer political or admin-
istrative positions, specific tax breaks, bias in the allocation of
or access to public resources including public expenditure, infras-
tructures or rents from natural resources.
• The victory also enables the winning group to enjoy public prizes
in the form of power and dominance. This prize includes politi-
cal power, control over public policies, imposing cultural values,
religious dominance etc.
However, private prizes are dividable, whereas, public prizes are not.
As a result of this nature of the prizes group size matters for the former,
however, the latter is independent of the group sizes.
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Let µ be the per capita value of private prizes at stake and π be
the public payoffs. Enjoyment of the public payoffs is dependent on
the existing institutional concessions. For instance, the winning group
can impose its favourite policy or values on other groups only using
the existing institutional frameworks. In addition, the payoffs to losers
are also determined by their distance from the winner group. It is also
assumed that if the ideal policy of group j is chosen then group i’s
payoff to be uijπ. The inter-group distance between i and j is given as
dij ” uii ´ uij, therefore, group i’s loss from the indicated ideal policy
of group j is πdij. The model view conflict as a situation in which
there is no agreed-upon rule aggregating the alternative claims of dif-
ferent groups. Accordingly, the outcome of each group is determined
significantly by the amount of “conflict resources” r that contribute
by individuals in each group.4 This implicitly means the expenditure
is the cost of conflict cprq and assuming c is increasing, smooth and
strictly convex, with c1p0q “ 0. Further, aggregation of every individ-
ual’s contribution of resources in group i denote by Ri. Further, the




Ri. The per capita value of resources that are expended
in conflict denoted by ρ ” RN{N . The expected payoff, then, to an









4The indicated resources comprises time, effort and risk Esteban et al. (2012).
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where ni ” Ni{N is the population share of group i.
But, how are resources chosen? The model allows for a flexible
specification in at one hand, individuals k of group i choose r to max-
imise their own payoff, at the other end, there is full intragroup cohe-
sion and individual contributions are chosen to maximise group payoff.
The expected utility of the group i members k to be:




where, α lies between zero and one. When α “ 0, individual payoffs
are maximised. When α “ 1, then group payoffs are maximised. α
is open for various interpretation. It is noteworthy that the weight
α could be altruism, or some measure of the extent to which group
monitoring, possibly with promises and threats, manages to overcome
the free-rider problem of individual contribution.
Furthermore, as aforementioned in Section 1.2 polarization and
fractionalization are the most commonly used distributional indexes
to the analysis of social conflicts. In addition, the Esteban and Ray
(2011) theoretical model employed Greenberg-Gini index (G) to show









However, it is not easy to apply this index to distributions that are
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nonmonetary like ethnic, religious or political.5 Thus, as Garćıa Mon-
talvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) propose in this chapter we assume that
dij “ 1 for all i ‰ j and, of course dii “ 0.
Based on fractionalization, polarization and Greenberg-Gini index
indexes of ethnic divisions Esteban and Ray (2011) state the next
proposition.
Proposition 1 (Esteban and Ray, 2011). Equilibrium per capita con-
flict ρ is approximately determined as follows:






where σ ” c
1pρqρ
π`µ
is a measure of the intensity of conflict, λ ” π{pπ`
µq is the relative publicness of the prize and α denotes the ratio of
the value of the conflict to the value of the potential benefits from the
conflict.
Therefore, the equilibrium level of conflict intensity is determined
exogenously based on individual preferences, group size, nature and
size of the prize and level of group cohesion. In other terms, the right-
hand side of the given equation is explained by the three distributional
measures: P , F and G{N .
In this model, the publicness of the prize refers to the effect of the
polarisation, while privateness of the prize refers the effect of fraction-
alization. In addition, high group cohesion enhances both measures
and in the meantime diminishes the effect of G/N.
5Esteban and Ray (2011) aregue that when groups are identified by their income,
dij could be abslout or relative of income differances between i and j.
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Finally, as stated in Section 1.4 the current approach, uses this
conflict theory to test the effect of exogenous economic shocks and
social diversity on the political stability of developing countries upon
the amount of information available.
1.4 The empirical approach
We analyze the effect/impact of social heterogeneity and commodity
export price shocks on the incidence of civil conflicts.
As independent variables, together with the commodity export
price shocks, we use distributional indexes as well as other domes-
tic conflict indicators. As control variables, we consider the GDP per
capita, Gini indexes, population size, foreign aid per capita, institu-
tional quality indexes and geographical proxies, which are commonly
used in the conflict literature.
1.4.1 Conflict
Conflict is a very extensive and comprehensive subject matter in the
social sciences. Nonetheless, since we are interested in analyzing the
impact of commodities export price shocks on the political stability, we
deal with violent domestic conflicts. Specifically, following the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (UCDP/PRIO) definition, an armed conflict is
“a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or terri-
tory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least
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one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related
deaths” in one calender year (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). Note
that, this definition of conflict is highly associated with violent con-
flicts that result in death tolls, a minimum 25-dead threshold per year
and per dyad (consists of two conflicting primary parties).6
As aforementioned, we consider conflict incidence rather than con-
flict onset. The conflict incidence is an indicator variable that is 1 if
there is a conflict in t, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the conflict inci-
dence is attributed 1 due to the outbreak of a new episode of conflict
or the continuation of the existing conflict. Similarly, conflict onset
is an indicator variable that captures conflict outbreak. However, the
onset in year t is 1 if there is a conflict in t but there was no conflict in
t´1; 0 if there is no conflict in t and t´1; and not defined if there was
conflict in t ´ 1. Hence, this measurement of conflict has limitations
since, for instance, it is indistinguishable whether a conflict event has
a new fresh cause or it is the continuation of a previous fight.
Furthermore, as Esteban et al. (2012) argue, the threshold defini-
tion of “onset” is “far from a sharp concept: it is arguably no differ-
ence from a year of “incidence”, though to be sure, the factors that
contribute to the outbreak of a conflict do not coincide with the ones
that keep feeding it. Therefore, we use, in all our specifications, the
measure of conflict incidence in order to avoid these shortcomings.
Accordingly, we use the data in the UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset
6http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/
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and Incidence Dataset (which contains a country-year version of the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) v.4-2015), codes for each
country and the years from 1946 to 2014.
The UCDP/PRIO database offers a yearly binary indicator, whether
peace or a violent conflict occurred between named non-state armed
actors and government forces that directly killed at least 25 people
as thresholds. In the categorization scheme of the earlier versions of
the UCDP/PRIO, ACD the intensity variable contained three cate-
gories: minor, intermediate and war.7 However, in the new version
of this database, the intensity variable is coded into two categories.
“Minor”, conflicts, estimated to have killed an average of between 25
and 999 individuals per year; and “War” conflicts or civil wars, that
are estimated to have killed at least 1, 000 individuals in a given year
(Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). We take both “minor” and “war”
thresholds of the UCDP/PRIO dataset as a dependent variable in or-
der to estimate the effect of price shocks in the framework of social
heterogeneity.
For robustness check purpose, we also consider the impact of price
shocks on an alternative measure of conflict (conflict intensity/civil
war). Conflict intensity measures the magnitude of the armed con-
flicts. The UCDP/PRIO “Armed Conflict Dataset” describes conflict
7In the old versions of UCDP/PRIO, “minor” conflicts threshold estimated
more than 25 battle-related deaths in a given year; “intermediate” the category
was defined as “more than 25 battle-related deaths but fewer than 1, 000 per year”
and, “war” whereby at least 1, 000 people per year are killed.
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intensity by defining the level of conflict episodes that satisfy the mini-
mum (UCDP/PRIO 25 deaths per year) and war (UCDP/PRIO 1, 000
deaths per year). For intensity, the dataset assigned a value of 0 for
“peace”, for conflict events that qualify as UCDP/PRIO 25 deaths at
the minimum and under UCDP/PRIO 1, 000 deaths at the maximum,
the dataset was assigned a value of 1, and events that recorded as
UCDP/PRIO 1, 000 (and above) death are assigned 2. In addition, we
contemplated the impact of commodity price shocks and social het-
erogeneity on civil wars. We obtain civil war data from the Center
for Systemic Peace dataset. The dataset computed “Major Episodes
of Political Violence” (MEPV), which gives the magnitude scores of
episode(s) of civil warfare involving that state in that year. It scales 1
(lowest) and 10 (highest) for each MEPV (Marshall, 2010). As mag-
nitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed, we recode and assign
a value of 1 for presence of civil war, and 0 for the case with zero
episodes.
1.4.2 Commodity Price shocks
As aforementioned, the commodity export price shocks are taken as
a proper indicator of exogenous economic shock, related to civil con-
flict. In doing so, data on world market commodity prices as well
as commodity export and import values are collected for 57 globally
traded commodities. We extract global commodity price data manly
from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. Addition-
ally, we also take price data from Global Financial Data (GFD) and
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from Bazzi and Blattman (2014). The data for net export value (ex-
port minus import) was primarily extracted from the United Nations
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) according to
the SITC1 system as organized in 2015.8 Finally, for multiple price se-
ries commodities, we use the average price; and, in order to fill in the
missing values, we use the UN International Trade Statistics Yearbooks
and Regional Statistical Yearbooks.
With these datasets, following Deaton et al. (1995); Dehn (2000);
Musayev et al. (2014) and Kinda et al. (2016), we compute the price
shocks index in three steps. Firstly, we develop a geometrically weighted








where PIi,t is the commodity price index in country i for year t; Pj,t
is the world price of commodity j at time t; and wi,j is the country-
specific weighting of the commodity at the base year (the share of
commodity j in total exports).
Secondly, following Musayev et al. (2014), and Kinda et al. (2016),
we take the mid-point of the sample period (1990) as the baseline. The
total net export value of all commodities for which the country is a net
exporter is calculated for each country. Then the individual 1990 net
export values for each commodity are divided by this total in order to
8Whereby, the individual UN member countries gathered data from national
and international sources via the United Nations Statistics Division.
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achieve 1990 country-commodity specific weights, wi,j (when all years








where Qij denotes the export volume of commodity j at the base
year.
As Musayev et al. (2014) state, although the purpose is to capture
the price shocks rather than quantity movements, at the same time,
due to the difference between abundant and scarce resource countries,
it is critical to hold volumes constant. Applying this approach has
important advantages. On the one hand, index does not capture any
resource discoveries or any other quantity shocks after the base year.
On the other hand, the index does not capture any post base year
temporary volume shocks other than which may have occurred in the
base year itself. It is noteworthy that this approach avoids possible
endogeneity problems that may arise in the event of a volume response
to price changes.
Finally, for each country, we regress the normalised price index on
an intercept. In order to measure the price shocks as the estimated
residuals of an econometric model of the logarithm of commodity price,
regressed on its lagged values (up to three) and quadratic time trend.9
9While we compared the linear time trend and the quadratic time trend, we
found the liner time trend fitted the price indexes better. Hence, we use the liner
price index in our regression.
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This approach helps to make the price shock indexes stationary and
removes predictable elements from the stationary process.10





Since prices are given by the global market and are differently trans-
mitted in each country, the latter regression has been ran for each
country i separately.
1.4.3 Measure of Heterogeneity
Ethnic and religious fractionalization, as well as polarization indexes,
are our core independent variables. Hence, our analysis is based on
the dataset developed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), who
use various sources for both ethnic and religious diversity. On the one
hand, the religious dataset is constructed from two main sources. The
primary source is “L’Etal des Religious Dans le Monde (ET)”, which
provides relevant information to the calculation of indexes of diversity,
and “The Statesman’s Yearbook (ST)” is used as a supplementary
source. Accordingly, the dataset considers almost all kinds of religious
from the biggest religious groups to to the small collectives religious
groups. On the other hand, for the ethnolinguistic diversity dataset,
the basic source is the “World Christian Encyclopaedia (WCE)”, which
presents classifications in the form of ethnolinguistics.
10Applying this approach for price shock index helps to overcome the other com-
modity price shocks approaches disadvantages (which does not ensure that the
price index is stationary). For further discussion, please refer Kinda et al. (2016).
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The Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) ethnolinguistic diversity
dataset is mainly distinguished from the commonly used ethnic diver-
sity index in the literature (Alesina et al., 2003; Fearon and Laitin,
2003) since they have followed the Vanhanen (1999) perception. On
the one hand, the Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) is distinguished
from the Alesina et al. (2003) dataset on the level of disaggregation
of ethnic groups, i.e., while the formers follows the Vanhanen (1999)
approach to identify the relevant level of disaggregation, the latter
dataset captures the more disaggregated level. On the other hand,
the Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) approach diverges from the
Fearon and Laitin (2003) dataset by the measures of distances among
groups. Although the measurement of group distances is a very stren-
uous process, Fearon and Laitin (2003) propose that the measuring
should be a continual work in progress with respect to the expertise
of specific countries, whereas Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) do
not contemplate the distance between groups. Therefore, we use the
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) dataset for distributional indexes
because the dataset consolidates both ethnic and religious indexes of
the fractionalization and the polarization measures.
1.4.4 Sample Size
The availability of data for different variables from various sources,
intensely limited the size of our sample. We studied 89 non-OECD
member countries and 57 exportable primary commodities over the
period of 1970-2014. We have a total number of 4005 of observations.
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Our analysis starts by considering several indicators for the incidence of
conflict and then we deal with conflict intensity and civil war pattern.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics.
Variables N mean sd min max
Civil conflict incidence 4,005 0.221 0.415 0 1
Civil conflict intensity 4,005 0.291 0.590 0 2
Civil war 3,780 0.122 0.396 0 3
Ethnic Polarization 4,005 0.565 0.218 0.0170 0.982
Ethnic Fractionalization 4,005 0.519 0.264 0.0320 0.959
Religious Polarization 4,005 0.586 0.325 0.00200 1
Religious Fractionalization 4,005 0.350 0.213 0.00100 0.676
Ethnic Polarization (Fearon) 4,005 0.551 0.322 0 0.990
Ethnic Fractionalization (Fearon) 4,005 0.0476 0.0534 0 0.201
Price Shocks 3,738 3.03e-10 0.582 -2.489 2.732
Log GDP Per Capita 4,005 3.001 0.600 1.761 4.750
Log Population 4,005 6.900 0.733 5.205 9.135
Log Foreign aid per capita 3,834 38.89 57.12 -50.79 722.7
Democracy 3,822 3.161 3.797 0 10
Autocracy 3,822 -3.179 3.580 -10 0
Political Rights 4,005 0.471 0.499 0 1
Civil liberty 4,005 0.499 0.500 0 1
Mountainous 4,005 15.35 20.24 0 74.50
Noncontiguous 4,005 0.101 0.302 0 1
1.4.5 The Empirical Conflict Model
In order to measure the effect of exogenous economic shocks and social
heterogeneity on intrastate conflict, we regress conflict incidence in
the baseline specification. The price shocks and the interaction terms
with different measures of ethnic and religious diversity are the main
explanatory variables. Similarly to Janus and Riera-Crichton (2015),
the baseline estimation model is as follows,
Cjt “ α ` βSjpt´1q ` γSjpt´1q ˆ pPj ` Fjq ` µj ` τt ` ρjt` εjt, (1.5)
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where Cjt is an indicator of the conflict event in country j at year t, and
Sjpt´1q is the deviation of the price index from its conditional mean with
up to three years lag from the past price index. We augment the basic
conflict regression model by adding two variables: ethnic (religious)
Polarization (Pj) and ethnic (religious) fractionalization (Fj), which
can capture the effect of a country’s social composition. Bazzi and
Blattman (2014) and Janus and Riera-Crichton (2015), who consider
lagged terms of shock as a better predictor of conflict, we use up to
three-year lagged shocks instead of contemporary shocks. µj and τt are
the country and year fixed effects. The country fixed effect is used to
address endogenous bias that eminent from the time-invariant country
characteristics. ρjt is the country-specific time trends. The idiosyn-
cratic error term εjt captures any other unobserved characteristics of
the conflict model and account for the generated price shock regresses.
The econometric justification for using a year fixed effect is aimed at
eliminating any potential bias from the co-movement of global shocks
and global conflicts. The cluster standard errors by country, and the
use of a country-specific time trend accounts for secular changes in
conflict risk that may vary across countries and offers a flexible way
to incorporate import price shocks (Bazzi and Blattman, 2014). In
all regressions, we use robust standard errors clustered at the country
level to control for serial correlation.
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The preceding literature provides heterogeneous results regarding the
impacts of income shocks on civil conflicts. In particular, Bazzi and
Blattman (2014) and Janus and Riera-Crichton (2015) show different
effects of the commodity export price shocks on civil wars in relation to
social diversity. Bazzi and Blattman (2014) conclude that in countries
with ethnic heterogeneity, price declines have no clear effect on civil war
onset; whereas, Janus and Riera-Crichton (2015) show that commodity
terms of trade declines result in civil war with intermediate ethnic
diversity (i.e. ethnic polarization).
The present study differs from the previous literature in three as-
pects. First, it extends the literature developed by Bazzi and Blattman
(2014) and Janus and Riera-Crichton (2015), but it complements them
by considering how the commodity export price shocks in societies
with ethnic and religion diversity impact on civil conflicts. Second,
the study considers an alternative price shocks measurement by using
a regression that explains the price index by its lags and a time trend,
and considers the residuals as the shock indicator. Third, the study
analyzes the effect of price shocks mainly on civil conflict incidence
rather than conflict onset, which has been the norm in the previous
literature. For robustness check, we use conflict intensity and civil war
measures of conflict.
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The main analysis focuses on the impact of income variation and
social heterogeneity on civil conflicts, hence we use the interaction
between commodity net-export price shocks and indexes of social di-
versity (i.e., ethnic and religious fractionalization and polarization).
Hereinafter, we provide p values in parentheses using robust standard
errors adjusted for clustering at a country level. Moreover, each model
is estimated controlling for country-specific time trend, year and coun-
try fixed effects. Note that all of explanatory variables are lagged one
year to partly address the problem of endogeneity.
The baseline specification in Table 1.2 displays the effects of gen-
eral commodity expert price changes/shocks and social diversity on
civil conflicts in the sample developing countries. Each column of the
table contains the lagged commodity export price shocks (∆PS) and
we continually add the distributional indices and the interaction terms
between the lagged price shocks variables and the distributional in-
dices. We generate the interaction terms, which are the product of
the centered main terms (i.e. price shocks and distributional indices)
that makes the interaction terms more meaningful and easy to inter-
pret Balli and Sørensen (2013). Primarily, our analysis is based on
the Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) measure of distributional in-
dices. Hence, columns 2 to 5 employ the interaction between lagged
price shocks and ethnic polarization, price shocks and ethnic fraction-
alization, price shocks and religious polarization and price shocks and
religious fractionalization, respectively. Additionally, in columns 6 and
7 we use the Fearon and Laitin (2003) ethnic polarization and fraction-
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alization indices as alternative measures of ethnic diversity.
In column 1, we simply regress commodity export price shocks
(∆PS) at time t ´ 1 (that is, one year earlier) on the likelihood of
civil war, measured as civil conflict incidence, at time t. Although the
coefficient has the expected sign, statistically it is not significant, as no
surprise. In other terms, this result confirms the findings of Bazzi and
Blattman (2014) and Janus and Riera-Crichton (2015) that commodity
export price shocks are generally fund a weak predictor of civil conflicts
when used as a stand-alone measure of conflict indicator. However, in
column 2, we add variables of the ethnic polarization (∆EP ) and an
interaction between the lagged commodity export price shocks and eth-
nic polarization (∆PSEP ). In this specification the (∆PSEP ) and
(∆EP ) yield a positive and statistically significant coefficient while the
effects (∆PS), by itself, is positive but not statistically significant. As
the interaction term is our variables of interest, a positive and statis-
tically significant of the (∆PSEP ) implies that a change to the price
of the net export commodities increases the probability of civil con-
flict when the ethnic polarization is evaluated at its mean value. In
real terms, our estimation implies that a percentage point changes in
the commodity export price is associated with 0.05 percentage point
increase in civil conflict incidence in ethnically polarized countries, per
year. In a similar vein, regression 6 that is interaction between the price
shocks and the Fearon and Laitin (2003) index of ethnic polarization
(∆PSEPf), also reveals that a positive and statistically significant
outcome at a confidence level of 90% (Table 1.2).
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In contrast, for highly ethnically diverse societies (i.e. in the case of
ethnic fractionalization), a general commodity export prices shocks are
associated with a decreased probability of civil conflicts. In column 3
we estimate the (∆PS), ethnic fractionalization (∆EF ) and the inter-
action of the two main variables all together. The results of regression
3 revile that ∆PS contribute positively to civil conflict incidence, but
the estimated coefficients is not statistically significant. The interac-
tion term ∆PSEF , on the other hand, has negative and statistically
significant coefficient. The results also indicate that the general price
shocks negatively interacts with ethnic fractionalization. Holding the
ethnic fractionalization at its mean value, a standard deviation change
on the commodity export price decreases probability of civil conflicts
approximately by ´0.02 percentage points per year. Once more, this
result is consistent with the Fearon and Laitin (2003) index of ethnic
fractionalization, as shown in column 7 (Table 1.2).
Meanwhile, in Table 1.2 the subsequent two columns (4 and 5)
report the estimation effects with religious polarization and religious
fractionalization, respectively. In regression 4, we estimate the effect
of price shocks on civil conflict incidences that incorporates index of
religious polarization (∆RP ) and the interaction term of lagged com-
modity export price shocks and religious polarization (∆PSRP ). The
result of the regression 4 show that in religiously polarized societies,
civil conflicts decline for the general commodity export price shocks.
Furthermore, a standard deviation change on the commodity export
price, the likelihood of civil conflict risk decrease approximately by
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´0.044 percentage points per year, the religious polarization is evalu-
ated at its mean value. Similarly, religiously fractionalized societies are
at less risk of civil war that could result from general commodity ex-
port price shocks. In other words, a standard deviation change on the
commodity export price decreases probability of civil conflict approxi-
mately by ´0.11 percentage point per year, religious fractionalization
is evaluated at its mean value.
Finally, in column 8 of Table 1.2 we estimate the effect of price
shocks on civil conflict risks with ethnic polarization and fractional-
ization as well as religious polarization simultaneously. We observe
a high degree of correlation between religious fractionalization and
polarization (0.95) variables. In order to avoid the multicollinearity
problem only the religious polarization has been included in the last
column regression. However, the sign and significance of the interac-
tion coefficients in our estimations remains the same independent of
the specification used.
The results of the baseline specification in Table 1.2 manifest that
the heterogeneous effect of the general commodity export price shocks
on civil conflict incidences. An increasing effect of commodity export
price shocks on the probability of civil conflicts is observed as societies
are ethnically polarized, in the one hand. This prediction fits with the
findings in the body of literature that investigates the link between
ethnic polarization and the probability of civil conflicts. Esteban and
Ray (1999) show that a two-point symmetric distribution of population
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maximizes conflicts. Specifically, in the “bipolar” distribution of ethnic
polarization, where a large ethnic minority (close to 50 percent) faces
an ethnic majority, the probability of civil conflicts gets to a high level
(Reynal-Querol and Montalvo, 2005). Dealing with the effect of ethnic
polarization and commodity price shocks Janus and Riera-Crichton
(2015), also show an increasing effects on the likelihood of civil war.
On the other hand, in the case of general commodity export price
shocks we find that decreasing effect of price shocks when the types
of social diversity is described in terms of ethnic and religious frac-
tionalization. These result are consistent with the older cross-country
literature suc as Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler
(2004), which finds that social fractionalization decreases conflict in
OLS regressions. Nonetheless, we are impressed by the fact that a
robust and significant negative effect of religious polarization interact-
ing with price shocks. This ambiguity may reflect the high correlation
between the index of religious polarization and fictionalization, as dis-
cussed above.
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Note that in the baseline specification, we consider the general case
of the price shocks, i.e., negative and positive price changes together.
In other words, results in Table 1.2 do not specify any particular effect
of income decline on the likelihood of civil conflicts linking to social
diversity. In our sample, the distribution of the positive and the nega-
tive values in price shocks index is almost equivalent. Hence, to explore
the implication further, we consider the effect of income decline and
income rise on civil conflict risks separately by limiting our observa-
tion distinctly to the negative price shocks and positive price shocks.
This approach enables us to explain the three aforementioned stylized
channels of conflicts that are related to income variations. Moreover,
the approach identifies which channel is linked to a specific index of
social heterogeneity.
Table 1.3, documents result in the effect of ethnolinguistic and reli-
gious heterogeneity and negative and positive price shocks on conflict
incidence. In Panel A, column 2 and 4 the regression result shows that
the interaction term between the lagged commodity price shocks and
ethnic polarization ∆PSEP and religious polarization ∆PSRP , sub-
sequently, affect positively political stability, but the estimated coeffi-
cients are not statistically significant. On the other hand, in columns,
3 and 5 income declines are associated with increasing the probabil-
ity of civil conflicts, where the social heterogeneity of the analyzed
countries are characterized by ethnic and religious fractionalization.
Quantitatively, while a standard diversion declines in the commod-
ity price, the likelihood of civil conflict increases by 0.03 percentage
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points per year, in the case of ethnic fractionalization interacting with
the lagged of commodity export negative price shocks (∆PSEF ), by
holding ethnic fractionalzation index on its mean. Correspondingly,
the interaction between the lagged commodity export negative price
shocks and religious fractionalization (∆PSRF ) also imply that every
standard deviation decreasing in the net export commodity prices in-
creases the probability of civil conflict in 0.06 percentage points per
year.
When the commodity export prices fall in primary commodity ex-
porting countries, in particular, affects the household’s income, and
livelihoods, as well as government’s revenue. Especially, low-income
social groups with their limited resilience become vulnerable to shocks.
In this sense, the literature links income decline with the opportunity
cost of fighting (see Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The main argument is
that when incomes are higher, the cost of the insurgency is higher, as is
the cost of defending against it, simply because the recruiting of fight-
ers is more expensive. However, when incomes are lower insurgency
may break out due to lower cost of fighting. Therefore, deteriorated
socioeconomic situations may motivate individuals to increase their
benefits by engaging in rebellion, which intensifies conflicts between a
particular social group and the government. Hence, in such societies
the opportunity cost of engaging in conflict is small (see for instance,
Hirshleifer, 1995; Miguel et al., 2004; Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2011). Our
findings in columns 3 and 5 support the hypothesis of “opportunity
cost” as a possible channel of conflict in relation to income decline, in
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particular with ethnically and religiously fractionalized societies.
In addition, decreasing income in relation to negative commodity
price shocks may directly affect the state capacity by lowering govern-
ment revenue.11 This internal situation may push the government to
adjust the budgets in order to accommodate revenue shortfall. This
also indirectly affects the economic growth of a country through bal-
ancing macroeconomic variables, as well as through increasing the gov-
ernment expenditure on pro-poor programs etc. Hence, a weak state
capacity limits the government to address public demands, and to re-
solve social antagonisms. Furthermore, such weak government capacity
combined with inadequate security and compromised institutional in-
tegrity result to fragile political stability. Results in Panel A of Table
1.3, clearly show that with lower income and ethnically and religiously
fractionalized societies, the probability of conflict seems to increase.
Thus, the results supports the hypothesis of “weakening state capac-
ity” as a civil conflict channel setting with decreasing income.
On the other hand, Panel B in Table 1.3, reports findings for com-
modity export positive price shocks. In column 2, the regression re-
sult reports that positive and statistically significant coefficient for the
presence positive price shocks. In this specification, we estimate the
interaction between the lagged commodity export positive price shocks
11With regard to the impact of adverse commodity price shocks Kinda et al.
(2016) show that negative shocks to commodity export prices lower GDP growth,
government revenues, and savings, while the shocks increase debt in foreign cur-
rency and unemployment. Such economic slowdown and unemployment, combined
with savings withdrawal, etc., jeopardize the government capacity.
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and the ethnic polarization (∆PSEP ). Accordingly, the result shows
that a standard deviation is increasing in commodity export price rises,
then the probability of civil conflicts by 0.11 percentage points, hold-
ing the index of ethnic polarization on its mean. While we compare
the magnitude of conflicts by taking into consideration sizes of coeffi-
cients with respect to ∆PSEP , we find a larger coefficient in the case
of positive price shocks (0.727), than in the general price shocks case
(0.164).
Once more the estimation findings for the positive price shocks
on commodity exports state the validity of “state prize” hypothesis
as a potential channel of insurgency break out relating to income ris-
ing. In other words, our finding justifies that an instant increase in
the rent that is controlled by a state can become a source of political
destabilization in ethnically polarized countries by motivating insur-
gent groups (i.e., ethnic groups that are bereft of the power) to cap-
ture the state power, given institutional constraints. In addition, the
positive commodity export shocks may channel conflicts in relation
to the pre-existing structure of social status. Typically, there could
be ethnic, religious or geographic-specific products. This can be dic-
tated by environment, type of soil, nature of livelihood and type of
production culture of a specific society. We can consider, for instance,
capital-intensive and labor-intensive type of production (Abidoye and
Cal̀ı, 2015; Dube and Vargas, 2013). If, suddenly, the price of some
commodities of a specific production sector goes up significantly, then,
some ethnic or religious groups may be much richer in contrast to other
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groups. In this regard, Mitra and Ray (2014) find that in India the
Hindu attacks against Muslims systematically follow a period of dif-
ferential wealth growth among the Muslims. Hence, the conflict may
be due to the heterogeneity of products as one of the ethnic groups
may make enough money from the positive shock to buy arms to use
in the next season. As larger natural resource rents appropriable by
government increase the gain from fighting, likewise the positive price
shocks for commodity exports have substantial incentive to capture the
government.
Finally, the social heterogeneity indices (i.e., ethnic and religious
polarization and fractionalization) have a divergent effect on civil con-
flicts in relation to changes in the commodity export prices. Our find-
ings show that the magnitude of increase or decrease on conflicts is
determined by the type of commodity export price shocks interacting
with the ethnic and religious diversity indices.
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1.5.2 Labour and capital intensive commodities
In this subsection, we estimate the disaggregated commodity shocks
by distinguishing between different types of commodities that may
vary in their publicness versus privateness of the conflict payoffs. Ta-
ble 1.4 deals with subcategories of commodity export price shocks ef-
fects on civil conflict risks. Accordingly, we classified the types of
commodities into two subcategories: agricultural and mineral. This
classification helps to distinguish the effect of labor-intensive (agricul-
tural products), and capital-intensive (minerals and energy products)
export price shocks on conflicts, in various type of social diversity.
The rationality of this classification is to particularize the type prize.
As Esteban and Ray (2011) define conflicting groups are assumed to
contest to seize public or private payoffs. By assuming that in most
of developing countries agricultural commodities are mainly owned by
individuals, export price shocks in these type of commodities affect pri-
vateness of the prize. Whereas the minerals and energy commodities,
predominately, considered to be public properties. So, price shocks on
this commodities are associated with public prizes. In doing so, we
test whether civil conflicts distinct from or affected by a specific type
of prize that depends on the type of commodities.
Panel A of Table 1.4 presents the agricultural commodities export
negative price shocks and their effects on a domestic conflict in rela-
tion to different set of social diversity. Unlike other commodities in the
sample, almost all countries export agricultural commodities. The re-
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sults in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.4 exhibit that the interaction terms
between the agricultural commodity export price shock and religious
diversity have increasing effect on civil conflict risks at 90% confidence
interval. Similarly, in the Colombian particular case, Dube and Vargas
(2013) find that a sharp fall in coffee prices during the 1990s lowered
wages and increased violence in more coffee cultivating regions.
The capital-intensive commodities estimation results, presented in
the same table, Panel B. The results exhibit interesting patterns. The
regression result in column 3 suggests that, the mineral commodities
export price fall will decreases the probability of civil conflict incidence
by 0.008 percentage points while the ethnic fractionalization index re-
mains on its mean. Whereas the mineral commodity price reduce will
increases the likelihood of conflict risks by ´0.054 and ´0.012 percent-
age points in religiously polarized and fractionalized societies.
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We also test the robustness of the baseline results to the inclusion of
other variables that have been found to be significantly related to civil
conflicts. Furthermore, we check the robustness of our findings using
alternative dependent variables such as civil war and conflict intensity,
as well as using particular specifications such as control for low-income
economies, control for regional dummies and conflict prone countries.
In Table 1.5, we use additional control variables to examine the
effect of commodity export price shocks and ethnic and religious di-
versity on civil conflicts. Throughout the columns, we add the lagged
controls such as population, GDP per capita, foreign aid per capita,
institutional and governance indicators: institutionalized democracy,
institutionalized autocracy, civil liberties, and political rights. More-
over, we use geographical controls including mountainous terrain and
“noncontiguity” (i.e., whether a country has regions separated by land
or water) in the Logistic Regression Model.These control variables have
been widely used in the literature (see, for instance, Fearon and Laitin,
2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005;
Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Brückner and Ciccone, 2010; Esteban
et al., 2012; Nunn and Qian, 2012; Janus and Riera-Crichton, 2015).
The inclusion of any of the control variables improves the explana-
tory capacity of the model by raising the values of the coefficients
compared to one which does not include any control variable. Most
importantly, the inclusion of all these additional explanatory variables
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does not change the qualitative results that we have in the baseline
specification. Indeed, most of the control variables are statistically sig-
nificant with the expected signs. For instance, the real GDP per capita
has the expected decreasing effect on the probability of civil conflicts,
as countries with higher income are less exposed to civil conflicts even
in conditions of economic shocks. Likewise, out of the institutional
quality variables, while democratization and protection of civil liber-
ate decrease the probability of civil conflicts, institutional autocracy
has an increasing effect. Therefore, these results show that our baseline
findings are robust.
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Table 1.8 presents alternative measures of political instability.
columns 1 to 4 report a non-binary measure of conflict intensity. Ac-
cordingly, we find a homogeneous effect of the price changes to the
conflict intensity as we have in the baseline specification. The inter-
action term between the lagged commodity export price shocks and
ethnic polarization increases the likelihood of civil conflicts, but ethnic
fractionalization, religious polarization and religious fractionalization
interacting with the lagged commodity export price shocks decrease
the likelihood of civil conflict intensity. Once more, in columns 5 to
8 of Table 1.8 we find a similar effect of the commodity export price
shocks on the probability of civil wars, as with the baseline results
reported above. In general, in the case of ethnic polarization we have
an increasing effect, but for ethnic fractionalization, religious polar-
ization and fractionalization the decreasing impacts appear to be the
predominant effects.
Within the developing country group, economies with higher in-
come per capita, may be less conflict-prone in response to commodity
export price shocks. Considering that countries with less income are
more likely to respond to price changes, as a robustness check, we focus
on a sample with low-income economies to examine how sensitive they
are for economic shocks.12 In spite of a significant drop in the sample
12The cut-off levels for low-income and high-income countries are taken to be
as in DeJong and Ripoll (2006) and Musayev et al. (2014), where the income
economies classification are as the threshold as defined by World Bank’s income
measures. The resulting income definition applies to the following categories: low-
half income countries are those with real per capita GDP less than 5, 499 USD and
the higher-half income countries are those with real per capita GDP above 5, 500
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size, the results in Table 1.9 remain statistically significant. Waddell
(2006) argues that the very poorest countries may be less conflict prone
because their populations have less surplus to fight with and to fight
over. Our estimation results, however, show that the least developed
countries are more vulnerable to civil conflicts. Results from column 1
to 4 of Table 1.9, revile that commodity export price increase the likeli-
hood of civil conflicts in the least developed countries where ethnically
divers and religiously polarized.
Further, in our robustness check process, we have also test whether
our findings are driven by a particular region’s characteristics that
might usually be deemed as conflictual. Table 1.10 reports the findings
we obtain by adding three regional dummies: Africa, Asia and Latin
America. The results appear unanimously significant, while keeping
the signs we have in the baseline specification. This indicates that
the effects of social heterogeneity and commodity export price shocks
have equivalent effects on civil conflicts in all developing regions. In
addition to the regional specification, we also have estimated the effect
of commodity export price shocks and social diversity on political in-
stability to conflict prone countries. Table 1.11 show that the baseline
results remain robust with the conflict prone countries specification.
USD. In this study, the classifications are based on the beginning sample income
rankings.
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1.6 Conclusions
This chapter analyzes the joint effect of exogenous economic shocks
and the pre-existence of social heterogeneity (i.e, ethnic and religious
diversity) in the political instability of developing countries. We aim to
find the impact of commodity net export price shocks at various levels
on intrastate conflicts in the presence of ethnic and religious polariza-
tion and fractionalization, and we provide an economic interpretation
for these conditions. We use a sample of 57 globally tradable com-
modities that exported from 89 developing countries over the period
1970-2014. The ethnic and religious diversity indices was mainly ex-
tracted from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Meanwhile, as an
alternative indicator of social fragmentation we also used the Fearon
and Laitin (2003) index of ethnic polarization and fractionalization.
Our empirical findings show that the commodity prices shocks af-
fect the likelihood of civil conflicts. Indeed, the shocks have different
patterns of impact on civil conflicts depending on the nature of social
diversity, types of price shocks (overall, positive or negative) and the
type of the commodity.
In particular, during overall price shocks, the more ethnically po-
larized the society, the graver the adverse effect of price changes, and
thus the higher the probability of civil conflicts. This investigation
has illustrated that price shocks have an increasing impact on the like-
lihood of civil conflicts, where ethnic diversity is characterized by a
bimodal distribution (polarization). Furthermore, this effects remains
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robust specific to the positive shocks to the export commodity prices.
The commodity price shocks have a mixed effect on the probability
of civil conflicts in relation to ethnic and religious fractionalization, as
well as religious polarization measures of social diversity. The overall
changes in the commodity export prices have a decreasing effect on
the probability of civil conflicts, with these social diversity indices. In
contrast a fall in export commodity prices increased violence in relation
to these three indices of social diversity.
Furthermore, using desegregating data by commodity types we find
out that heterogeneous outcomes on the likelihood of civil conflicts
outbreak. When the capital-intensive commodities price decline, the
probability of conflict decrease in ethnically fractionalized societies.
Whereas the violence will increase in religiously polarized and fraction-
alized communities. The labour intensive commodities prices decrease
also leading to similar outcomes in terms of increasing civil conflicts in
religiously polarized and fractionalized societies.
It is noteworthy that in the Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)
measure of religious diversity, there is a high degree of correlation be-
tween religious fractionalization and polarization (0.95) which creates
a problem of multicolinearity if they are used together. Even though
we treat them separately, we have similar effects on the incidence of
civil conflicts. This indicates that the Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005) religious diversity has a limitations on its own. This problem
mainly emanates from the categorization of the religious groups. In
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other words, they opt for merging all Christians into one group when
computing religious polarization in some African countries. This turns
out to be a problem of equidistant: the distance between Protestants
and Muslims in these countries is much larger than between Protestants
and Catholics. But this is not the case in Northern Ireland. Another
case is that Sunnis and Shi’as are both Muslim groups. Moreover,
the violence of the opposition between the two branches of Islam has
not been the same through time. Hence, this flaw indicates the need
to have alternative religious polarization and fractionalization indexes
which address these shortcomings.
Finally, note that our findings have significant policy implications.
A better understanding of the transmission channels through which
unpleasant commodity price shocks affect civil conflicts is essential for
adopting policy measures to prevent destructive civil wars in develop-
ing countries. Policy makers may need to focus on building national
economy resilience in order to address any adverse impacts of shocks to
commodity prices. In addition, enhancing state capacity and improv-
ing institutional qualities will enable countries to prevent the threat
of violent conflicts and wars which follow from fluctuating income.
Furthermore, social heterogeneity affects the political stability of the
countries. The results shows that ethnic polarization has positive ef-
fects on increasing the probability of civil conflicts. Adopting policy
frameworks that promote economic equality, social justice and cultural
integrity between social groups may help to establish mutual under-
standing which results in harmony, peace and sustainable security.
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1.7.1 Definitions of variables
Next, we provide definitions of all variables used throughout the chap-
ter.
1. Major variables
(a) Different measures of Conflict
i. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset defined “armed
conflict” as a contested incompatibility that concerns
government and/or territory where the use of armed
force between two parties, of which at least one is the
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-
related deaths. In this study we consider incidences,
new conflicts in a year, and intensity from UCDP Monadic
Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset.
ii. Incid. Incidence of intrastate conflict. The UCDP
dataset coded 1 in all country-years with at least one
active conflict/conflict-dyad (a dyad consists of two con-
flicting primary parties and at least one of the primary
parties must be the government of a state).
iii. Intensity . The UCDP dataset defines the intensity level
of conflicts in a country-year bases. Two different inten-
sity levels are coded. 1: minor armed conflict/conflict-
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dyad, which result in at list 25 deaths; and 2: as war
for battle-related deaths of at least 1, 000 per year per
incompatibility.
Armed Conflict and Intervention (ACI) Datasets orga-
nize “Major Episodes of Political Violence” data of con-
flicts. Major episodes of political violence are defined
by the systematic and sustained use of lethal violence
by organized groups that results in at least 500 directly
related deaths over the course of the episode. Episodes
are coded for time span and magnitude and are assigned
to one of seven categories of armed conflict. We consider
only civil war (CIVWAR). The dataset designated each
episode that spans a certain number of years (“inclusive
years”) and is judged to have been of a certain, general
“magnitude of societal-systemic impact”. The conflict
episodes range from 0 (no violence) to 10 (war). The
magnitude scores are considered consistent and compa-
rable across categories and cases, that is, approximating
a ratio scale. We give a value equal to 1 for all levels of
violence war, 0 otherwise.
(b) Main distributional measures
i. ETHFRAC and RELFRAC. Index of ethnic and reli-
gious fractionalization, respectively, which measure the
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probability that two randomly selected individuals in
a country will belong to different ethnic or religious
groups.










Where Πi is the proportion of people who follow religion
i or belong to ethnic group i.
ii. ETHPOL and RELPOL. Ethnic and religious polariza-
tion indexes that measure the normalized distance of
a particular distribution of ethnic and religious groups,
respectively, from a bimodal distribution. Data for both
ethnic and religious polarization and fractionalization
indexes are obtained from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005).
















Alternatively, we used Fearon and Laitin (2003) group-
ings of ethnic farctionalization and polarization indexes.
However, we use δ “ 0.05, as defined by Esteban et al.
(2012).




nip1´ niq, where ni is the population share of group
i and m is the number of groups.
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ni2njkij where kij “ 1 ´ s
0.05
ij and sij,
are degree of similarity between two languages i and j,
given by the ratio of the number of common branches to
the maximum possible number (15 for the entire tree)
Esteban et al. (2012).
2. Main control Variables
(a) Governance and Institutional variables
i. AUTOCR. Institutionalized Autocracy. The data source
of of this variable is Polity IV dataset version 2013.
In Polity IV dataset autocracy takes values 0-10 scale,
with 10 signifying extreme autocracy.
ii. CVLIB. Civil liberty (lack of liberty). The data source
of this variable is Freedom House (2016), which consid-
ers a 1-7 scale (7 indicates the lowest level of liberties).
iii. DEMOC. Institutionalized Democracy. The data source
of of this variable is Polity IV dataset version 2013. In
Polity IV dataset democracy ranges from 0 (the lowest)
to 10 (the highest) scale.
iv. CVLIB. Civil liberty (i.e., lack of liberty). The data
source of this variable is Freedom House (2016), which
consider a 1-7 scale (7 indicates the lowest level of lib-
erties).
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v. POLRIGHTS. (i.e., Lack of) political rights. The data
source is Freedom House (2016), which considers a 1´7
scale (1 indicates most free).
(b) Other control variables
i. FAID. Foreign Aid Per capita for each year. Source:
World Bank Database.
ii. GDPPC. Log of real GDP per capita corresponding to
each year. Data source is the World Bank Database(2016).
iii. MOUNT.% mountainous terrain. The data sources is
Fearon and Laitin (2003), who use the codings of geog-
rapher A.J. Gerard.
iv. NCONT. Noncontiguous states, referring to countries
with territory holding at least 10,000 people and sep-
arated from the land area containing the capital city
either by land or by 100 kilometers of water. Source:
Fearon and Laitin (2003).
v. POP: Log of population each year. Source: the World
Bank Database (2016).
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1.7.2 Data details and results of estimations
Table 1.6: List of commodities
Code Commodity Code Commodity Code Commodity
1 Aluminium 23 Lead 45 Silver
2 Asbestos 24 Linseed oil 46 Sisal
3 Bananas 25 Live cattle 47 Soybean oil
4 Barley 26 Live poultry 48 Soybeans
5 Beef 27 Live sheep 49 Sorghum
6 Cashews 28 Live swine 50 Sugar
7 Coal 29 Lumber 51 Sunflower Oil
8 Cocoa 30 Maize 52 Swine
9 Coconut copra oil 31 Manganese 53 Tea
10 Coffee 32 Natural gas 54 Tin
11 Copper 33 Nickel 55 Tobacco
12 Copra 34 Olive oil 56 Wheat
13 Cotton 35 Oranges 57 Wool
14 Diamond 36 Palm oil 58 Zinc
15 Fish 37 Pepper
16 Fishmeal 38 Petroleum
17 Gold 39 Phosphates
18 Groundnut 40 Poultry
19 Groundnut oil 41 Pulp
20 Hides 42 Rice
21 Iron ore 43 Rubber
22 Jute 44 Shrimp
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Table 1.7: List of countries
Code Country Code Country Code Country
1 Afghanistan 31 Gabon 61 Panama
2 Algeria 32 Gambia 62 Papua New Guinea
3 Angola 33 Ghana 63 Paraguay
4 Argentina 34 Guatemala 64 Peru
5 Bahamas, The 35 Guinea 65 Philippines
6 Bahrain 36 Guyana 66 Rwanda
7 Bangladesh 37 Haiti 67 Saudi Arabia
8 Barbados 38 Honduras 68 Senegal
9 Benin 39 India 69 Sierra Leone
10 Bolivia 40 Indonesia 70 Singapore
11 Botswana 41 Jamaica 71 Solomon Islands
12 Brazil 42 Jordan 72 Somalia
13 Burundi 43 Kenya 73 South Africa
14 Cameroon 44 Kuwait 74 Sri Lanka
15 Central African Republic 45 Liberia 75 Syrian Arab Republic
16 Chad 46 Madagascar 76 Sudan
17 China 47 Malaysia 77 Tanzania
18 Colombia 48 Malawi 78 Thailand
19 Comoros 49 Mali 79 Togo
20 Congo, Republic. 50 Malta 80 Trinidad and Tobago
21 Costa Rica 51 Mauritania 81 Tunisia
22 Cte d’Ivoire 52 Mauritius 82 Turkey
23 Cyprus 53 Morocco 83 Uganda
24 Democratic Republic of the Congo 54 Mozambique 84 United Arab Emirates
25 Dominican Republic 55 Nepal 85 Uruguay
26 Ecuador 56 Nicaragua 86 Venezuela, RB
27 Egypt 57 Niger 87 Yemen, Republic
28 El Salvador 58 Nigeria 88 Zambia
29 Ethiopia 59 Oman 89 Zimbabwe
30 Fiji 60 Pakistan
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Chapter 2
Trends in African Migration
to Europe: Drivers Beyond
Economic Motivations
Overview. The current migration and refugee crisis in Europe re-
quires an understanding of a range of different migration drivers be-
yond the well-known economic determinants. In this chapter, we view
migration from a broader human security perspective and analyze the
determinants of regular and asylum seeker migration flows from Africa
to Europe for the period 1990–2014. Our results show that, in addition
to economic determinants, a combination of push and pull factors influ-
ences migration decisions by individuals. In particular, rising political
persecution, ethnic cleansing, human rights violations, political insta-
bility and civil conflicts in African source countries are all significantly
associated with increased migration flows into European destination
93
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countries. Therefore, our results underscore the need for the EU and
European countries to collaborate with the source countries, not only
in terms of supporting economic development in the source countries,
but also in promoting human security: human rights, democracy, peace
and social stability.
Keywords: international migration, asylum seeker, refugee crisis, hu-
man security, Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood.
2.1 Introduction
Migration and the refugee crisis are high on the policy agendas of
European countries, in relation to economic, security and social is-
sues. In the current wave of migration, Europe is witnessing a mixed-
migration phenomenon where a large number of economic migrants are
joining asylum seekers in their journey to reach the European continent
(Bertoli et al., 2013; Park, 2015). Each year hundreds of thousands of
immigrants flow into Europe mainly from Africa, the Middle East, and
South Asia.1 With such significant levels of migration inflow, European
countries are said to have reached a breaking point in their ability to
meet the European Union (EU) standards for receiving immigrants
and facilitating asylum applications (Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke,
1According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Na-
tions (2015b), more than 1,015,078 migrants and refugees arrived in Europe by
crossing the Mediterranean in the year 2015 and 362,753 in the year 2016. Re-
trieved from: http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean.
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2015). Furthermore, this influx has imposed internal ‘political fatigue’,
with nationalist parties gaining momentum in many EU member states
and with security tensions rising due to terrorist-linked incidents in
some countries (Park, 2015). On the other hand, thousands of peo-
ple perish every year while attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea
(Telschow, 2014). These events have created mounting pressure on
European governments, particularly from groups championing human
rights, to work and spend more on rescue missions and to facilitate to
entry for more immigrants. As a result, migration has now becomea
prominent feature in the economic, social, and political landscape of
European countries (Kerr and Kerr, 2011).
In response to these tense situations, European governments are
actively working to cut the flows of migrants and asylum seekers across
the Mediterranean in partnership with African governments (Garćıa An-
drade and Mart́ın, 2015). Important initiatives in this regard include
the EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Mobility (2014), in which
European and African governments pledged to combat human traffick-
ing,and to facilitate the return and readmission of migrants whose asy-
lum applications have been refused.2 The declaration also emphasized
the importance of addressing the root causes of irregular migration,
including by providing employment opportunities for the youth at re-
gional level. In the same year, the so-called “Khartoum Process” and
“Rabat Process” were established with a special focus on preventing
2https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32899-file´5. the eu africa declaration
on migration and mobilty 2014.pdf.
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and fighting migrant smuggling and human trafficking in the Horn of
Africa and Central, Western and Northern Africa, respectively. The
Valletta Summit in November 2015 brought by far the largest num-
ber of African and European heads of states and governments and
concluded with the EU setting up an Emergency Trust Fund to pro-
mote development in Africa, in return for African countries helping
European countries in the crisis.3 In June 2016, the EU established
a wide-ranging Migration Partnership Framework (MPF), which aims
to coordinate collaborations with African and other third country gov-
ernments (European Commission, 2016).
These intensified cooperation between the EU and African govern-
ments, including those that are authoritarian and which are accused
of severe human rights violations and political persecution, has caused
significant controversy. For instance, critics argue that by basing devel-
opment aid and foreign relations on countries agreement to cooperate
with EU migration control objectives, the EU is making a significant
policy change away from putting human rights as a central point of
EU foreign policy (Castillejo, 2017; Oette and Babiker, 2017; Human
Rights Watch, 2018). The Human Rights Watch (2018) further ar-
gues that this shift of policy could bolster the very security forces that
violate human rights and eventually fail to address the human rights
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A number of factors might be behind the EU’s apparent policy shift
away from its long-held policy of defending human rights in Africa
towards stronger border control and quicker returns of ’illegal’ mi-
grants. Obviously one can argue that the large number of migrant
flows might have forced the EU to prioritize the short-term objective
of reducing the number of immigrants above its principle of defend-
ing human rights. What is rather more visible from its publications
is the apparent stance taken by the EU that economic motives, rather
than human rights violations, are the principal reasons for migration
from Africa to Europe. In fact, it is explicitly stated in the ‘Migra-
tion Compact’—an important contribution to the MPF document by
the Italian government—that while migrant flows through the East-
ern Mediterranean route include both refugees and economic migrants,
‘flows through the Central/Western Mediterranean route are composed
mainly by economic migrants’ (Italian Government, 2016, p.1). The
MPF document also contains several phrases which implicitly endorse
this belief by the Italian government.4
Despite the seemingly divergent views held by European govern-
ments and human rights groups on the role of human security factors
in the recent migration flows from Africa to Europe, there is surpris-
4For instance, in discussing the importance of promoting investment
in African economies as a key long-term solution to address the root
causes of migration to Europe, the MPF states that ‘instead of letting
irregular migrants risk their lives trying to reach European labour mar-
kets, European private and public resources should be mobilised for
investment in third countries of origin.’(European Commission, 2016,
p.11, emphasis ours).
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HETEROGENEITY, MIGRATION, AND INSTITUTIONS 
Yitagesu Zewdu  Zergawu 
 
98 Chapter 2: Trends in African Migration to Europe
ingly little empirical evidence to substantiate either of these stances.
While a few extant studies have examined determinants of African
migration flows, they have however either focused exclusively on intra-
African migration flows or studied international migration from Africa
together with intra-African flows. For instance, investigating trends
of migration flows in sub-Saharian African (SSA) countries for the pe-
riod 1965–2005, Naudé (2010) finds that armed conflict and lack of
job opportunities are the most important determinants. However, he
employs net migration flows data, which are obtained as the differ-
ence between emigration and immigration per 1,000 inhabitants. Con-
sequently, Naudé (2010) does not examine determinants of bilateral
migration flows from a given sending African country to specific host
countries. Moreover, the net migration data include intra-African mi-
gration, which is the most prevalent form of African migration (Lucas,
2015). As a result, it is unclear to what extent his findings could
be used to explain trends in migration flows from Africa to Europe.
Similarly, Ruyssen and Rayp (2014) examine intra-regional migration
in SSA during the period 1980–2000. However, they do not consider
migration flows from Africa to Europe. Lucas (2015) provides an ex-
tensive literature survey and empirical study on the causes, patterns
and consequences of migration in Africa. In particular, by estimating
a gravity model of African migration flows to 220 states and territories
worldwide (including African states), he finds that violent conflicts,
but not the level of democratization, are important drivers of African
migration flows. Nonetheless, as an overwhelming majority of African
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refugees flee to another country in Africa, his results might be domi-
nated by intra-African migration trends.
The present study aims to fill the aforementioned gap in the litera-
ture by providing a thorough empirical examination of the role played
by human security factors in explaining trends in African migration to
Europe during the period 1990–2014. We consider the most basic level
of human security, including freedom from fear (threats to the safety
of people), freedom from want (threats to basic needs), and freedom
to live in dignity (threats to human rights and by extension access to
services and opportunities) (see, for instance, Anand, 1994; Gómez and
Gasper, 2013). We thus consider potential factors that provoke migra-
tion and displacement, including wars, civil conflict, economic depriva-
tion, violation of human rights and oppressive regimes (Erdemir et al.,
2008; Shrestha, 2017).5
For our empirical investigation, we construct a new panel dataset
on bilateral migration flows for a large number of destination (21 Eu-
ropean) and source (51 African) countries for the period 1990–2014.
While the choice of the period 1990–2014 is dictated by data avail-
ability, it is also a relevant period for the current migration crises in
Europe, since European countries have experienced a dramatic increase
in the flow of African migrants in this period and African migrants have
5Considering the Central American chilled migration tends, Clemens (2017)
show the causal relationship between violence and international emigration. Ac-
cordingly, connecting to migration experience and the presence of social networks,
violence can cause waves of migration that snowball over time, continuing to rise
even when violence levels do not (Clemens, 2017).
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started to become a visible part of the migrant stock in Europe.
Besides the trends in the regular migration flows from Africa to
Europe, this paper studies the bilateral migration trends by addition-
ally considering the flow of asylum seekers. It is noteworthy that this
approach is typically important in the study of non-economic deter-
minants of migration and for dealing with African forced-migration
trends that occur in the absence of human security. In this regard, the
existing empirical literature on bilateral migration largely focuses on
regular migration trends, either the flow of labor migrants or migrant
stocks, by excluding refugees and asylum seekers (e.g., Ortega and Peri,
2009; Mayda, 2010; Fitzgerald et al., 2014). However, given that the
rising number of asylum seekers is at the heart of the recent refugee
crisis in Europe, it is important to examine to what extent human
security factors drive the flow of African asylum seekers to Europe.
To examine the determinants of bilateral migration flows from Africa
to Europe, we estimate a gravity model that is similar to the model of
Ortega and Peri (2013). Since the seminal work of Tinbergen (1962),
the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator has been widely used to
estimate various versions of the gravity model, both in the trade lit-
erature and in migration studies. A well-known drawback of the OLS
approach, however, is related to the fact that migration flows between
pairs of countries may be zero in a substantial percentage of observa-
tions, and omitting those zero observations biases the regression results
(Yotov et al., 2016). We address this methodological challenge in es-
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timating gravity models by using the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Like-
lihood (PPML) estimator, which is particularly suitable in regressions
where the dependent variable has a significant proportion of zeroes
(Beine and Parsons, 2015).
Our results show that broader human security factors are significant
determinants of the ‘South-North’ migration flows. In accordance with
the existing literature, income gaps between African and European
countries remain a strong determinant of migration flows. However,
income gaps are not the only important reason for the rise in the
migrant flows to Europe: broader human security factors in Africa
are equally important determinants of both regular and asylum seeker
migration trends. Indeed, we find that poverty, violent civil conflicts,
political persecution, human rights abuses and ethnic tensions have a
substantial influence on migration across our entire set of specifications.
Similar results are also obtained when we consider the flow of asylum
seekers as an alternative dependent variable. Our results are robust
to using alternative model specifications, to excluding North African
countries, and to employing OLS instead of the PPML estimator.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 intro-
duces the empirical specification of our model. Section 2.3 describes
our data in detail. Section 2.4 provides the results and Section 2.5 of-
fers a conclusion. Finally, Section 2.6 presents supplementary material
in the Appendices.
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2.2 Empirical Model Specification
Since the seminal work of Tinbergen (1962), the gravity model of trade
has been widely used to study the effects of trade policies on dyadic
trade flows (see Anderson, 2011 for a review of theoretical founda-
tions). This model specifies international trade as a positive function
of the attractive “mass” of two economies and a negative function of
the distance between them. The migration literature has vastly im-
plemented the gravity model (e.g., Lewer and Van den Berg, 2008;
Mayda, 2010; Beine and Parsons, 2015; and Figueiredo et al., 2016).
Beine et al. (2016) summarize this strand of literature and provide a
practical guide on the empirical implementation of the gravity model
in migration studies.
The current study closely follows the gravity model developed in
Ortega and Peri (2013). Accordingly, taking as a starting point the
random utility maximization (RUM) theoretical models developed by
Beine et al. (2011), Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Ortega and Peri
(2013), in which income maximization problems or wage differentials
are a driving force to make a migration decision, we emphasize the
broader human security conditions. Specifically, we analyze a number
of political and socio-cultural factors that may influence the individ-
ual’s decision to move from his/her current location. Furthermore,
similar to Ortega and Peri (2013) and Beine et al. (2016), our empiri-
cal model specification considers multiple destinations.
Formally, out of the set of N global countries, the individual i from
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his/her source country s P S “ s1, s2......sn, where S Ď N , makes a
decision of whether to stay in his/her source country s or to migrate
to the destination country d P D “ d1, d2...dn, where D Ď N . It is
noteworthy that, as indicated in, among others, Kennan and Walker
(2013), individuals are assumed to have rational expectations. Thus,
they make an informed decision to migrate in seeking their maximum
utility.6 Therefore, following Ortega and Peri (2013), we assume the
following utility function:
Vsdt “ αs ` αd ` αdt ` β1Wsdt ` β2Fsdt ` β3Xsdt ` θZsdt, (2.1)
where, Vsdt represents the utility in country d for individuals from
country s and it captures not only the average earnings, but also the
average security of individual i by leaving for destination country d.
Moreover, αs and αd are time-invariant source-specific push factors
fixed effects and time-invariant destination-specific pull factors fixed
effects, respectively. In addition, αdt denotes destination-country fixed
effects and it varies over time and across countries. Hence, the fixed
effects capture the role of amenities, destination-specific cost hetero-
geneity as well as variables that may change through time (essentially
immigration policy, culture and attitudes towards immigrant commu-
nity) and affect the choices made by the immigrants. Although our
primary focus is on human security factors at the source, in some
specifications we also consider particular pulling factors.
6For the sake of further discussion, Subsection 2.6.1 presents the theoretical
background of the migration model.
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In (2.1) a vector Wsdt represents the value of expected earnings
in the source country s and the destination country d in year t. In
this case, the income differential is measured using per capita GDP
of countries s and d. The vector Fsdt represents levels of freedom
(free from all forms of violence or political persecution) in the source
country s and the destination country d that vary over time t. To
estimate the effect of freedom on migration decision, we consider a
number of proxy variables, which include political stability (internal
and external conflicts), institutional quality (government stability, law
and order, control of corruption and bureaucratic quality), ethnic and
religious tensions (fractionalization and polarization), democracy, au-
tocracy, political rights and civil liberties of the source countries. In
particular, we follow Baudassé et al. (2018) to frame the role of political
institutions on migration flows using the exit and voice dichotomy of
Hirschman (1970). Accordingly, if people have the freedom to express
their dissatisfaction through the existing institutional frameworks, they
choose the voice option and prefer to stay at home. Whereas, viola-
tions of basic rights due to poor quality of institutions leads them to
choose the exit option and leave their country. The vector Xsdt rep-
resents other control variables, notably, socioeconomic factors such as
urbanization and socioeconomic conditions. The vector Zsdt stands for
country-pair overall migration costs that affect migration decisions.
These factors include time-varying factors, such as migrant networks,
and time-invariant variables such as geographic distance, common lan-
guage, common legislation and colonial legacy.
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Considering separability in migration costs and including an error
term in (2.1), we estimate the following estimable model of the flow of
regular immigrants (Msdt) from the source country s to the destination
country d at time t:
lnpMsdtq “ β1lnpWsdt´1q`β2Fsdt´1`β3Xsdt´1`θZsdt`αs`αd`αdt`εsdt.
(2.2)
(2.2) could be estimated using OLS. However, migration between
pairs of countries may be zero in a substantial percentage of obser-
vations, and omitting those zero observations biases the regression re-
sults. In particular, due to the fact that (2.2) is a pseudo-gravity model
in a double log form, a large number of observations could be dropped
because of the zero values in the dependent variables Msdt. Hence,
standard regression methods, such as the OLS, require omitting obser-
vations with zero values, which leads to inconsistent estimates of the
coefficients due to selection bias. Furthermore, a second source of bias
is related to the fact that if the variance of εsdt depends on one or more
of the determinants of Msdt, then the expected value of εsdt will also
depend on some of the regressors in the presence of zeroes (Silva and
Tenreyro, 2006).
These methodological challenges in estimating gravity models can
be addressed using the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML)
estimator (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Beine and Parsons, 2015). Using
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PPML, we estimate the exponential of the gravity model as
Msdt “ exprβ1lnpWsdt´1q`β2Fsdt´1`β3Xsdt´1`θZsdt`αs`αd`αdtsusdt,
(2.3)
where usdt “ exppεsdtq is a multiplicative error term.
In addition to the regular migration flows (Msdt), we also estimate
a gravity model for the flow of asylum seekers (ASsdt) from the source
country s to the destination country d in year t.
2.2.1 Conceptual Foundations
A growing body of theoretical and empirical literature on international
migration has documented that individuals have complex and often
overlapping motivations for leaving their places of origin, including in-
come (Naudé, 2010; Dutta and Roy, 2011; Clemens et al., 2014; Doc-
quier et al., 2018), political instability (Naudé, 2010; Docquier et al.,
2018; Clemens, 2017; Shrestha, 2017), migrant networks (Beine and
Parsons, 2015), institutions (Baudassé et al., 2018) and climate change
(Beine et al., 2015). In the following, we discuss the conceptual foun-
dations for the set of human security variables that we consider in the
current study by categorizing them as economic factors, civil conflicts,
institutional quality, and ethnic tensions of source countries.
Economic factors: A large body of literature indicates that a signif-
icant difference in average income in terms of average GDP per capita
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(GDPPC) between the origin and destination countries is a principal
determinant of international migration. In other words, relatively low
personal income in the source countries in comparison with per capita
income in the destination countries motivates potential immigrants. In
our context, hence, the actual economic deprivation and abject poverty
of most African countries will likely have an enormous push effect on
the migrants and refugees of Africa. On the other hand, economic
development and relatively high personal incomes in Europe attract
immigrants.
Civil conflicts : It is assumed that individuals will have a greater
incentive to migrate when there are civil conflicts than when there
are no conflicts in their home countries. In the absence of safety and
security the expected returns of labour, development projects, and in-
vestments is significantly decreased. Since civil conflicts directly affect
both the security and livelihood of individuals’ people are likely to be
forced to migrate in search of alternative means of survival. Control-
ling for economic and other determinants, on the average one may,
therefore, expect to see a higher number of migrants from source coun-
tries devastated by civil conflicts. The African political condition, in
general, is characterized by historical injustices and oppressive gover-
nance structures (Ongayo, 2008). Since attaining independence, many
states have experienced civil wars, large-scale mass killings of civilians,
and other forms of direct political violence for decades (Dunn, 2009).
The United Nations Conference on Trade And Devolopment (2018) il-
lustrated that in the African context, severe conflicts often lead to a
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significantly increased flow of internally displaced people or refugees,
if they flee across borders. Moreover, conflicts can also be a driver
of economic migration. Hence, conflict is one of the human security
indicators that are explored in this chapter.
Institutions: Likewise, weak performance of institutions in source
countries may be a sufficient motive for emigrating in search of in-
stitutions which perform better (Baudassé et al., 2018). Very often
totalitarian regimes are a push factor of migration. The lack of democ-
racy, political rights, and civil liberties, and endemic corruption act as
push factors for migrants seeking greater freedoms (Solimano, 2010).
In line with the Hirschman (1970) “exit and voice” dichotomy, indi-
viduals may decide to migrate when institutions are not satisfactory
and fundamental human rights are violated.
Mostly in countries where there are autocratic political systems
and state sponsored persecution, harassment, discrimination and tor-
ture people who disagree with the policy or ideology of the government,
and/or have minority religious beliefs or ethnic backgrounds (Solimano,
2010) are pushed toward migration. In non-democratic countries, even
when individuals are not physically persecuted restraints of fundamen-
tal freedoms may ultimately motivate them to leave their country of
origin. In sum, if the political environment is hostile, then the ten-
dency is that the economic outcome is most likely to be poor. There-
fore, such situations trigger migration for political and economic rea-
sons. In a similar vein, Solimano (2005) argues that in non-democratic
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cases “individuals that are unsatisfied or disconnect with the current
political and economic conditions may choose to exit their home coun-
tries”. Hence, we assume that better institutional quality reduces mi-
gration flow while poor institutional performances motivate individu-
als to leave their home countries and relocate to more democratic and
safer countries where they can pursue better freedom, protection, ed-
ucation, and careers. Accordingly, Naudé (2010); Ruyssen and Rayp
(2014); Lucas (2015), among others, show that the African migration
flow—at least the intra-African migration—is profoundly influenced by
the political set-up of the continent. Furthermore, due to the overly
repressive character of the regimes, the majority of African countries
have been receiving the lowest rankings on political rights and civil
liberties for decades.7 These preceding events have made Africans vul-
nerable to displacement, including migration within and emigration
from the continent.
Ethnicity : Ruble (1989) ethnic identity “developed, displayed, ma-
nipulated or ignored in accordance with the demands of a particular
situation”. In this context, it is noteworthy to consider that social
identity serves as a structural foundation for potential group forma-
tion and social conflicts. When conflict arises, ethnic identities may
result in suboptimal behavior (Constant and Zimmermann, 2011). Ex-
isting literature has argued that ethnic tensions raises the likelihood
of waging civil conflicts and engenders a kind of “structural violence”.
Ethnic heterogeneity increases the probability of civil conflicts and
7See https://freedomhouse.org/regions/sub-saharan-africa.
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civil wars (see, for instance, Reynal-Querol and Montalvo, 2005; Es-
teban et al., 2012; Giménez-Gómez and Zergawu, 2018). Fearon and
Laitin (2003) further stipulate that between 1945 and 1999, about 51%
of major civil wars originated as a result of ethnic conflicts. Moreover,
where there are ethnic tensions women, children, and other vulnerable
social groups are exposed to various forms of sexual, physical, and non-
physical violence in relation to their ethnic-national identities (Korac,
1998). Hence, we assume that civil conflict and structural violence
such as molestation, marginalization, ethnic tension, segregation, and
the development of an underclass along the line of ethnic identities
significantly increases the flow of international migration.
Bang and Mitra (2013) show that ethnic-related conflicts increase
the fraction of skilled labor migration.
In this context, the contemporary African political set-up is pro-
foundly influenced by ethnic identity. The inter-ethnic relationships in
Africa, especially in the political arena, are associated with competi-
tion, exclusiveness, the prevalence of genocidal violence and conflicts
among ethnic groups (Berman, 1998 and Daley, 2006). On top of the
political violence and instabilities, human and democratic rights vio-
lations are prevalent across the African continent (Mutua, 2009).
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We construct a new panel dataset with information on migration flows
and asylum seeking as well as on several macroeconomic, political and
institutional factors covering 21 European countries of destination and
51 African countries of origin from 1990 to 2014 (see the list of countries
in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 in Subsection 2.6.3).
While the choice of the post-Cold-War period is dictated by data
availability it has two main merits. First, it is the most relevant period
with respect to the current migration crises in Europe. In the trends
of international migration towards Western Europe observed since the
Second World War, there are three distinct periods: (1) the labor mi-
gration from the 1950s till the beginning of the 1970s; (2) the family
migration in the mid-1970s, and (3) the ‘third wave’, of the interna-
tional movement that emerged in the post-Cold War era (Geddes and
Scholten, 2016). It is noteworthy that there has been a marked surge
in the number of immigrants, specially asylum seekers, to Europe since
the early 1990s. Second, this period also allows us to take into con-
sideration some of the former Eastern European countries, for which
data is typically available after 1990.
In the following two sub-sections, we describe in detail the depen-
dent and explanatory variables that we use in the current study. Specif-
ically, we first present the sources and the construction of migration
data, both regular flows and asylum seekers, which are our alternative
dependent variables. Subsequently, we discuss the explanatory vari-
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ables, which include several economic and political determinants of
international migration (Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for these
variables).
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variables N mean sd min max
Bilateral migration flow 26,775 260.5 1,815 0 84,978
Bilateral asylum seekers 26,775 74.7 369.6 0 15,819
GDP per capita destination (in thousand) 26,723 31,624 21,429 1,445 116,664
GDP per capita source (in thousand) 26,670 1,624 2,709 64.81 23,348
Urban population at source (in thousand) 26,712 606,591 956,926 34,481 83,300
Political Stability at source 26,775 50.4 5.88 42 61
Network (stock migration in thousand) 26,775 7,212 309 27 183
Common language 26,775 0.133 0.339 0 1
Colonial ties 26,775 0.0523 0.223 0 1
Distance 26,250 5,699 2,076 716.6 16,632
Hegemony 26,775 0.0467 0.211 0 1
Common legislation 26,775 0.284 0.451 0 1
Ethnic fractionalization at source 24,150 0.615 0.267 0.05 0.959
Ethnic polarization at source 24,150 0.527 0.209 0.014 0.897
Civil conflict at source 26712 .210 .407 0 1
Political Regime Characteristics at source 26,775 0.231 5.456 -9 10
Political rights at source 26,775 0.392 0.488 0 1
Civil liberates at source 26,775 0.471 0.499 0 1
Government stability at source 19,425 2.756 1.867 0 1
Socio-economic conditions at source 19,425 3.982 1.649 0 8
Corruption at source 19,425 2.406 0.962 0 5
Law and order at source 19,425 3.089 1.182 0 6
Democratic accountability at source 19, 425 3.021 1.286 0 6
Bureaucracy quality at source 19,425 1.379 0.892 0 4
Investment portfolio at source 19,425 7.16 1.46 4 9
External conflict at source 19,425 10.24 0.862 0 12
Religious tension at source 19,425 1.8 1.452 9 12
Note: N, mean, sd, min and max represent number of observations, mean,
standard deviation, minimum and maximum, respectively.
2.3.1 Migration flows and asylum seeking
The main dependent variable in (2.2) is the annual migration inflows
from the source country s to the destination country d, in a given year t
Mtsd. These data measure the yearly inflow of foreign-born population
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by nationality into the host countries. Note that the inflow migration
data exclude temporary visitors with a tourist visa or people who travel
for reasons of study, medical and business purposes.8
To construct the migration inflow series, we use two complemen-
tary data sources, which help us to cover the entire sample period.
The first source is the 2015 update of the international migration flows
data of the International Migration Report (IMR) of the United Na-
tions (United Nations, 2015a). This database contains time series data
on the flows of international migrants as recorded by 45 destination
countries.9
This database considers legal migration only and presents both in-
flows and outflows according to the place of birth, citizenship, place
of previous or next residence, both for foreigners and nationals, as
reported by each country’s national agencies in charge of collecting
migration data. For most African source countries, the database cov-
ers the period from the early 1990s until 2013, despite missing data
for some bilateral countries. The second source of data is the OECD
‘International Migration Database’ (IMD), which comprises migration
inflows data starting from the mid-1990s up to 2014.10 Similar to the
8In practice, national definitions of migration vary. The United Nations (1998)
defines a person who changes his or her place of usual residence for at least one
year as a long-term migrant, while a person who changes his or her place of usual
residence for more than three months but less than one year is considered to be a
short-term migrant.
9See a list of countries and the data at http://www.un.org/en/
development/desa/population/migration/data/empirical2/migrationflows.shtml.
10The data are available at https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG.
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IMR, IMD contains time-series data on the inflows of foreign popula-
tions into 35 OECD countries for which data are available. However,
IMD has a broader coverage than IMR.
In order to merge these two databases, it is critical to ensure that
the two databases have uniform definitions of migration. The majority
of destination countries report migration data that is collected from a
population register or are based on the number of residence permits
issued. We observe that in most cases these databases embrace over-
lapping figures when data are available. Hence, our final migration
inflow series is constructed mainly by using IMD, which has a broader
coverage of countries and periods. The IMR data are used to fill miss-
ing values. In rare cases, we fill missing data using simple averages
between data of the previous year and the following year.11
The African migration trend map in Fig. 2.1 in Subsection 2.6.2
shows the trend in migration flows from Africa to Europe. In general,
there has been a significant rise in the number of Africans migrating
to the selected European destination countries. Closer observations of
the data reveal that African immigrants are highly concentrated in a
few Western European countries. In particular, the maps display that
the major destinations of African migrants over the years are France,
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, although a considerable number
11About 5% of the migration flows data have been filled by interpolating ob-
servations to fill in missing values in intermediate years. Results obtained by re-
estimating our baseline results by dropping these missing values leaves our main
findings qualitatively unaffected, with little changes in the magnitudes of the esti-
mated coefficients. These results are available upon request.
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of Africans have also migrated into Belgium, Germany, and Sweden.
A large number of African immigrants in France and the United King-
dom may be partly linked to the fact that about 65 percent of the
contemporary African nations are former colonies of these two coun-
tries. It is well-established in the literature that colonial ties increase
migration flows by creating, for example, common official languages,
cultural attachments, social networks and business relations (Fawcett,
1989). Southern European countries, such as Italy and Spain, did not
have many African colonies, and hence have weaker colonial ties with
African countries. African migrant inflows into these Mediterranean
countries might have been induced by their strong economic perfor-
mance since the 1980s, as well as their growing economic integration
with other European countries as indicated by Bonifazi et al. (2009)
and Ortega and Peri (2013). However, this might also reflect the fact
that many immigrants use Southern European countries as a transi-
tion point to move to other Western European countries. Moreover,
as Fig. 2.1 shows, the North African countries Algeria, Egypt, Mo-
rocco and Tunisia have been sending a consistently high number of
migrants to Europe in the two and a half decades under study. This
might be related to the fact that geographical proximity as well as the
presence of a large Diaspora has served to attract immigrants due to
lower migration costs.
As an alternative dependent variable, we use data on yearly inflows
of asylum seekers into the European host countries by African coun-
tries of origin from 1990 to 2014. Utilizing the asylum seeking data
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helps to address two crucial issues. First, the widely-applied migration
inflow data comprise the regular inflow of immigrants into the hosting
countries only. As a result, the database omits the significant number
of asylum seekers, which are the primary source of the refugee crisis in
Europe.12 Second, we check the robustness of our results on the polit-
ical determinants of extra-continental migration by using the asylum
seeking data.
According to the 1986 definition of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an asylum seeker is a person who
has sought protection as a refugee, but whose claim for refugee status
has not yet been assessed.13 Data on the inflow of asylum seekers come
from the IMD database, which in turn is based on data provided by
the UNHCR. The UNHCR regularly produces complete statistics on
refugees and asylum seekers in OECD countries and worldwide.14 In
rare cases, we also use the original UNHCR database to complement
12Some authors believe that the tightness of immigration laws of European coun-
tries for African citizens exposes the majority of African immigrants to smuggling
and human trafficking in the process of entering Europe, critically risking their
lives (Castles, 2004; De Haas, 2007; De Haas, 2011).
13http://www.unhcr.org/excom/exconc/3ae68c43c0/detention-refugees-asylum-
seekers.html.
14These figures are most often derived from administrative sources, but differ-
ences are dependant on the nature of the data provided. In some countries, asylum
seekers are enumerated when the application is accepted. Consequently, they are
shown in the statistics at that time rather than at the date when they arrived in
the country. Acceptance of the application means that the administrative author-
ities will review the applicant’s claims and grant them certain rights during this
review procedure. In other countries, the data do not include the applicant’s family
members, who are admitted under different provisions (e.g., France), while other
countries count the entire family (e.g., Switzerland).
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Fig. 2.2 in Subsection 2.6.2 exhibits the inflow of African asylum
seekers into the European destination countries. The maps display an
upward trend in the flow of asylum seekers from Africa into many Euro-
pean countries: France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom. In particular, the annual inflow of African asylum
seekers has markedly risen in Germany since 2010. Additionally, Italy
is a significant entry point for African refugees. Despite being stricken
by the Euro-zone crisis (Mody and Sandri, 2012), tens of thousands
of asylum seeker migrants continue to board overcrowded and unsafe
boats heading to Italy, putting their lives in grave danger.
2.3.2 Economic and political determinants of mi-
gration
To substantiate the effects of the broad human security factors of inter-
national migration, we consider several economic, political and social
determinants of migration as explanatory variables, as aforementioned
in Subsection 2.2.1.
Economic factors: To capture the impact of African economic
drivers on Europe migration flows, we use the logarithm of GDPPC in
the source and the destination countries.16 Our primary source of the
15Downloadable at www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html.
16Adjusted by Purchasing Power Parity, PPP (at constant 2005 prices in US
Dollars).
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GDPPC data is the ‘National Accounts Main Aggregates Database’ of
the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Divi-
sion.17
Political factors: To investigate the effects of political factors on
migration flows from Africa to Europe, we employ several political
indices. We measure political instability by means of the civil conflict
incidence, which is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if there
is a new or existing conflict in year t, and 0 otherwise. We obtain
the data on conflict incidence from the Armed Conflict Database of
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Peace Research
Institute of Oslo (PRIO).18 This database codes armed conflicts at a
low threshold of 25 battle-related deaths per year in conflicts where
there is the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least
one is the government (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015).
Additionally, while the index of ethnic fractionalization measures
the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country
will belong to different ethnic groups, the ethnic polarization indexes
measure the normalized distance of a particular distribution of eth-
nic groups from a bimodal distribution. Data for both ethnic frac-
tionalization and polarization indices are obtained from Reynal-Querol
and Montalvo (2005). Following Esteban et al. (2012), we use time-
invariant versions of these variables, since short-run changes are likely
to be correlated with the incidence of conflict.
17See at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/introduction.asp.
18The data are available at:www.pcr.uu.se/data/.
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To assess how the characteristics of the political regimes affect the
bilateral migration flows, we use indicators for democratic and auto-
cratic patterns of authority. In the Polity IV database, the polity
series contains coded annual information on the level of democracy
and autocracy, both ranging from 0 (low) to 10 (high) (Marshall et al.,
2012).19 Following Esteban et al. (2012) and Giménez-Gómez and Zer-
gawu (2018), we transform these indices into time-invariant dummy
variables as short-run changes in these measures are likely to be corre-
lated with the incidence of conflicts. Specifically, a country receives a
time-invariant 1 (considered democratic) if it has received a democracy
score higher than or equal to 4 for 40% of the years and 0 otherwise.
The autocracy dummy is also computed in the same manner.
Furthermore, we test the effect on bilateral migration of civil lib-
erty and political rights variables, which are measured on a scale from
1 to 7 (where 1 represents the highest levels of liberties and political
rights and 7 indicates the lowest level). For ease of interpretation, we
converted these indicators to time-varying dummy variables. Specifi-
cally, a country is considered to have a favorable rating for civil liberty
or political rights in a specific year (dummy variable takes on 1) if it
receives a rating less than or equal to 4, and 0 otherwise. The data
source for these variables is Freedom House (2016).20
To examine the effects of overall political stability of the countries
19The Polity IV data are based on evaluations of the competitiveness of elections,
openness of the state, the nature of political participation, and the extent of checks
on executive authority (Marshall et al., 2012).
20See https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world.
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on bilateral migration flows, we use the political risk index from the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset. The Political Risk
rating includes 12 weighted variables covering both political and social
attributes. The risk components include government stability, socioe-
conomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external con-
flict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order,
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality.
In the dataset, the minimum number of points that can be assigned to
each component is zero, while the maximum depends on the indexed
weight that component is given in the overall political risk assessment
(Howell, 2011).
Finally, we also consider proxies for migration costs using geograph-
ical and cultural distances. In analyzing the costs of international mi-
gration, Beine and Parsons (2015) note that migrant networks play a
fundamental role in determining migration flow from two channels. In
terms of the assimilation channel, networks affect private costs and
benefits of migration, and from the point of view of the policy channel,
they lower legal entry barriers through family reunification programs
(Beine and Parsons, 2015). Hence, we estimate both migration flows
and asylum seeking trends by controlling migrant networks using bilat-
eral migration stocks. Our migrant network or diaspora variable, which
is again taken from the IMD database, is defined as the bilateral mi-
grant stock in the beginning of the year to which a flow corresponds.
Additionally, we use bilateral geographical distances between the two
capital cities (in kilometers) and dummy variables for the common lan-
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HETEROGENEITY, MIGRATION, AND INSTITUTIONS 
Yitagesu Zewdu  Zergawu 
 
2.4. Results 121
guage, common legal origin, colonial ties (if a source country is a former
colony of a destination), and hegemony (for a post-colonial relation-
ship). These variables are widely used in the migration literature as
important determinants of migration decision (see, for instance, Tay-
lor, 1994; Leblang et al., 2009; Kim and Cohen, 2010; Mayda, 2010;
Ortega and Peri, 2013; Ruyssen and Rayp, 2014; Beine et al., 2015;
and Docquier et al., 2018).
2.4 Results
In this section, we discuss the empirical results of the determinants of
migration flows from Africa to Europe using data on both regular and
asylum seeker migration flows.
First, we discuss determinants of the regular migration flows from
African countries to Europe as specified in (2.3). Subsequently, we
re-estimate (2.3) using the flows of asylum seekers as an alternative
dependent variable.
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2.4.1 Baseline Results
In (2.3), our dependent variable is annual migration flows between
bilateral countries. Our main hypothesis, in this case, is that hu-
man security conditions significantly influence international migration
flows in different ways. Specifically, GDP per capita at the source and
the destination countries are expected to have opposite effects on mi-
gration flows. While higher income per capita at the source country
is expected to show a negative effect on migration flows, income per
capita at the destination country is expected to display a positive im-
pact. Improvements in democratization and human rights protections
(both political and civil rights) within the source country is expected
to reduce the outflow of migrants, whereas civil wars, institutional
autocracy and ethnic cleansing are expected to increase the rate of
migration outflow. Concerning variables such as proxy that measure
migration costs, geographical distance is expected to have a negative
effect while social networks (proxied by migrant stocks) are expected
to increase migration flows by reducing psychological costs, facilitating
integration into the host society and increasing the possibility of ob-
taining a job. Having a colonial tie or cultural attachments (common
official language and a common source of legislation) is also expected
to reduce migration costs and, hence, increase migration flows.
Table 2.2 presents the baseline results of the determinants of the
regular migration flows from Africa to Europe. We consider the eco-
nomic and political indicators of human security together with indi-
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cators for the cost of migration that are discussed in Section 2.3 as
explanatory variables. In all the specifications, source-country fixed
effects pαsq are included. Additionally, we add destination-country
fixed effects pαdq in columns 1 and 2, year fixed effects pαtq in column
2, and time-variant fixed effects of the destination country pαdtq in
columns 3–8.
Generally, the coefficients for all explanatory variables are statis-
tically significant and carry the expected signs in most of the speci-
fications. Higher per capita income in destination countries and civil
conflicts, state autocracy and ethnic tension in source countries lead to
higher migration flows, as expected. The control variables such as mi-
grant networks, shared legal roots, common official language and colo-
nial legacy positively impact on migration flows. Conversely, higher
GDP per capita, democracy, political rights, civil liberties and the
landlockedness of the source country decrease migration flows. More-
over, the larger the distance between the source and the destination
countries, the lower is the bilateral migration flows.
To put results into the context of the estimated elasticities, we an-
alyze the variables across specific models. In Table 2.2, while column 1
controls for fixed effects of source countries pαsq and destination coun-
tries pαdq only, column 2 includes time effects pαtq as well. The results
show that a 10 percent increase in the average income earned per per-
son in destination countries leads to an increase of about 8.9 and 17.1
percent, respectively, in annual bilateral migration flows. Whereas, a
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10 percent increase in per capita income in source countries is associ-
ated with a 3.9 and 2.1 percent decrease in dyadic migration flows (from
source to destination countries), respectively. The results for the per
capita income are consistent with much of the literature (e.g., Bertoli
and Moraga, 2013; Ortega and Peri, 2013). These results suggest that
higher average income levels in destination countries exert a strong pull
factor on migration flows compared to the potential reduction effects
of income growth in source countries. A possible explanation could
be that income levels in source countries are substantially lower in
absolute terms than in destination countries. Regarding economic de-
velopment in the source countries, the literature depicts controversial
results between income in origin countries and emigration. Clemens
et al. (2014) summarize that across the literature cross-sectional stud-
ies generally find either a positive or inverted-U relationship between
income and emigration from low-income countries, while time-series
studies do not find a consistent relationship between income and emi-
gration.21 Accordingly, policy makers’ conventional wisdom (Clemens
et al., 2014), our findings confirm that an increase in average income
per capita in the origin countries is negatively correlated with mi-
gration flows, which coincide with several studies that use time-series
macro studies and control for country fixed effects (see, for instance,
Carlos, 2002; Hatton and Williamson, 2003; Clark et al., 2004; Clark
et al., 2007; Bertoli and Moraga, 2013; and, Ortega and Peri, 2013).
21For studies related to cross-sectional analysis, see, for instance, Hatton and
Williamson (2005); Czaika (2012); Belloc (2015); Dao et al. (2018).
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Since our main emphasis is on the human security factors in source
countries, we use appropriate fixed effects (i.e., time-invariant source-
countries pαsq and time-variant destination-countries pαdtq), as pro-
vided by column 3. Specifically, the results show that an increase in
per capita income in source countries leads also to a decrease in mi-
gration flows in this specification. Concerning political determinants
of migration, most of the variables exert statistically significant results
with the expected signs. In particular, the incidences of violent civil
conflicts in source countries are a significant push factor, which is in
accordance with Naudé (2010), who finds that violent civil conflicts
are important drivers of net migration from sub-Saharan Africa.
An increase in the government’s autocracy in the source countries,
which is an indicator of the presence of political persecution or hu-
man rights violations, leads to an increase in international migration
flows. Democratization processes in source countries, have a strong
reducing effect on bilateral migration flows. Specifically, the size of the
impact of the democratization dummy variable is particularly large:
using coefficients from the standardized variables, it is apparent that
democratization has the largest impact of all the determinants of bi-
lateral migration flows. Furthermore, measures of political and civil
rights in source countries, which proxy political freedom, often carry
the expected negative signs, although estimated coefficients are rarely
statistically significant. The results on the crucial roles of political
institutions (democracy, autocracy, political rights and civil liberties)
on the flow of African migration to Europe are consistent with most
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of the literature on international migration and institutions (Baudassé
et al., 2018).22
The other most important non-economic determinants of migration
flows are ethnic polarization and fractionalization, which measure the
level of ethnic diversity and tensions in source countries. In this regard,
increases in these social heterogeneity factors are found to strongly
increase increase migration outflows.
The remaining variables, which mainly proxy migration costs, are
also significant and carry the expected signs. Specifically, migrant
networks have a strong positive impact on bilateral migration flows.
Moreover, those African countries that are farther away from Europe
have fewer migrants heading to Europe due to distance-related costs.
On the contrary, variables of colonial ties, common legal roots, common
official language, and other cultural attachments increase migration
flows.
The rest of the columns of Table 2.2 contain robustness check re-
sults. In column 4, we employ ethnic fractionalization instead of ethnic
polarization, and find a qualitatively similar pushing effect of ethnic
tensions on migration flows. In column 5 we add urban population
22Baudassé et al. (2018) provides an in-depth review of the literature on in-
ternational migration and institutions and discusses the effect of institutions on
migration flows using the exit and voice dichotomy of Hirschman (1970). Accord-
ingly, if people have the freedom to express their dissatisfaction through the existing
institutional frameworks, they choose the voice option and prefer to stay at home.
Whereas, violations of basic rights due to poor quality of institutions lead them to
choose the exit option and leave their country.
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pressure and landlockedness of source countries to investigate their
potential effects on migration flows. The results show that having a
larger ratio of urban population does not have a statistically signifi-
cant effect on bilateral migration flows. However, the landlockedness
of the source countries decreases migration flows, as expected. The
effects of the rest of the explanatory variables remain qualitatively
unaffected. In column 6 we estimate determinants of bilateral migra-
tion flows omitting the two main former colonial powers in Africa (the
United Kingdom, and France). Once more, results on the main and
control variables remain robust and highly significant.
Historically, due to geographical proximity, Europe is the main
destination for North African migrants (Zlotnik, 1991; Flahaux and
De Haas, 2016). However, in the last two decades, there has been
a surge in the number of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa towards
Europe. Accordingly, in column 7 we estimate a sub-sample of sub-
Saharan African migration trends by omitting the five North African
countries from the full sample. The results show that the baseline esti-
mation is still robust despite the fact that the number of observations
are reduced by 9%. Finally, column 8 presents estimation results of
a sub-sample where five-years period average are considered (1990-94,
1995-99, 2000-2004, 2005-2009 and 2010-2014). These results show
that while an increase in income per capita in source is still a relevant
factor for reducing international migration flows, violent civil conflicts
and ethnic tensions are also important push factors for African mi-
grants. Notwithstanding, improvements of political rights in source
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substantially decrease the rate of bilateral migration flows in the five-
year intervals. These results confirm the robustness of our baseline
findings.
In summary, our baseline results reveal that human security deter-
minants are important factors in shaping the South-North migration
trends in the past few decades. The estimation results suggest that
African migration patterns towards Europe are significantly influenced
by economic, political, social and cultural conditions. In particular,
African extra-continental migrations are caused by poverty, civil wars,
ethnic tensions, and civil and political rights violations. The results
also indicate that improvements in per capita income and political
conditions in source countries are negatively related to the rate of mi-
gration flows. Furthermore, social, cultural, geopolitical and historical
ties with European countries have a significant impact in influencing
the trend in African migration towards Europe.
2.4.2 The relative importance of economic and non-
economic drivers of migration
Since our findings indicate that both economic and non-economic fac-
tors are important drivers of African migration to Europe, we assess
the relative importance of these two groups of migration drivers (Sub-
section 2.6.3 provides the standarized version of these variables.). In
doing so, next, we compare the (absolute value of) statistically signif-
icant coefficients of standardized migration determinants. It is worth
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emphasizing that most of the political determinants of migration affect
economic development in origin and economic development affects po-
litical factors including the probability of occurrence of civil conflicts.
Therefore, our comparison here does not consider the full (direct and
indirect) impacts of the economic and non-economic drivers of migra-
tion flows.23
The main economic determinant of migration flows from Africa to
Europe is the GDP per capita in source and destination countries. Due
to the fact that the GDP per capita in destination countries is incom-
patible with country-year fixed effects, it is only reported in columns
1 and 2 of Table 2.2. Hence, our comparison will be confined to these
two columns. Furthermore, non-economic migration drivers can also
be divided into political drivers, including the incidence of civil con-
flicts, democracy and ethnic polarization, and migration cost related
factors such as migrant networks and physical distance between the
source and destination countries.
A one-standard-deviation change from the mean of the economic
determinants (GDP per capita in source and destination countries) pro-
duces changes in migration flows of about 125% and 177%, in columns
1 and 2 of Table 2.7, respectively. Among political factors, only civil
conflicts, democracy, autocracy and ethnic polarization have statis-
tically significant effects on migration flows. Adding the respective
23As Clemens (2017, p.3) states, ‘causal attribution in this literature is com-
plicated by the fact that confounding determinants of migration may be varying
across time in correlation with national-level violence.’
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coefficients of these standardized variables, we obtain the sums 162%
and 221% in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.7, respectively.
Since most of the variables related with migration cost have a sta-
tistically significant impact on migrant flows from Africa to Europe,
we consider migrant networks, distance, common language, common
legislation and colonial ties. The sum of the respective coefficients of
these standardized variables is about 150% and 146% in columns 1 and
2 of Table 2.7, respectively. These results clearly highlight the impor-
tance of political factors as drivers of migration flows from Africa to
Europe. Nonetheless, the relative importance of economic drivers and
cost-related factors depends on the specification of the model. Specif-
ically, since the specification in column 2 of Table 2.7 includes both
economic determinants (GDP per capita in the source and destination
countries), then it appears to be more appropriate for comparing the
relative effects of economic and cost-related drivers of migration flows.
Accordingly, economic motivations are found to have larger impacts on
migrant flows from Africa to Europe than do the migration cost and
culture related factors.
Therefore, these results provide convincing evidence that African
migration flows to Europe are driven by broader human security factors
beyond economic motivations.
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2.4.3 Determinants of the flow of African asylum
seekers to Europe
Each year thousands of migrants from Africa enter Europe after brav-
ing the perils of crossing the Mediterranean Sea using inadequate trans-
port conditions. Although several factors could be listed as reasons, the
EU’s tightened entry policies for African migrants, on the one hand,
and the migrants lack of financial means and appropriate travel doc-
uments, on the other hand, are thought to have forced African immi-
grants to choose irregular routes (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011; Flahaux
and De Haas, 2016). To examine the extent to which human security
factors determine the flow of African asylum seekers to Europe, we
re-estimate (2.3) using data on the flow of asylum seekers.
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The estimation results of the determinants of the flows of asylum
seekers from Africa to Europe are reported in Table 2.3. While we still
use the specifications used in Table 2.2, the dependent variable here
is the number of annual asylum seekers, which represents the flows of
asylum seekers. The results obtained by using asylum seeker data are
qualitatively similar to the baseline results using regular migration flow
data. Specifically, an increase in the GDP per capita of the destination
countries is associated with an increase in the number of asylum seek-
ers. As in Table 2.2, throughout the specifications, an increase in the
GDP per capita of the source countries leads to a decrease in the num-
ber of asylum seekers. Moreover, political turmoil, fear of being per-
secuted for reasons of ethnicity or political opinion are found to drive
African migrants to demand refugee status in Europe. As expected,
the democratization of source countries’ leads to a decrease in bilat-
eral flows of asylum seekers. Throughout the specifications, the insti-
tutional quality variable has a statistically significant impact with the
expected sign. Furthermore, migration cost and culture-related control
variables remain statistically significant with the expected signs.
Regarding the relative importance of economic and non-economic
drivers of asylum seekers (see Subsection 2.6.3), Table 2.8 depicts the
political factors as the most important drivers of asylum seekers from
Africa to Europe. In particular, considering column 1 (2), a one-
standard-deviation change in economic, political and migration-cost
related factors produces a 26% (110%), 327% (278%) and 98% (93%)
change, respectively, in migration flows from Africa to Europe. These
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findings are also consistent with the results in the study by Moore and
Shellman (2004) where, by using a global sample of countries spanning
the period 1952–1995, it is documented that violent persecution (by
the authorities or dissident groups) has a substantially larger impact
on forced migration flows than economic factors. Moreover, it is also
noteworthy that the relative importance of political factors is stronger
for the flows of asylum seekers (Table 2.8) than it is for regular migra-
tion flows (Table 2.7).
2.4.4 The role of political determinants on migra-
tion flows
As shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, African migration to Europe is not
only driven by economic factors, but also by non-economic motiva-
tions such as civil conflicts, human rights violations and political sta-
bility. In the following, we emphasize the role of political factors in
extra-continental migration flows. In doing so, Table 2.4 reports the
results from regressions that include broader determinants of inter-
national (regular and asylum seeker) migration flows between Africa
and Europe.24 Specifically, we consider measures of political stability
and specific measures of political risks in source countries, in addition
to the aforementioned political and distributional indexes in Tables
2.2 and 2.3. In order to facilitate the comparison, column 1 of Ta-
ble 2.4 replicates column 3 of the baseline specification in Tables 2.2.
24We extend the previous regression model in (2.3) by adding vectors of political
instability in aggregated and disaggregated forms.
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column 2 of Table 2.4 estimates the impacts of political variables fo-
cusing on political stability and institutions as the key determinants
of international migration. It is noteworthy that in this specification
economic determinants are omitted and the coefficients remain with
the expected sign, except for institutionalized democracy. Once more,
civil conflict, institutionalized autocracy, and ethnic polarization are
positively correlated with migration flows. In column 3 we consider
alternative and disaggregated measures of both economic and politi-
cal institutions, which are taken from the International Country Risk
Guide (Howell, 2011). The set of indexes that we use in this anal-
ysis include socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, democratic
accountability, government stability, control of corruption, law and or-
der, bureaucractic quality, external conflict and religious tension of the
source countries. With the exception of external conflict and religious
tension, the rest of the indicators of institutional quality are supposed
to have a decreasing effect on migration outflows.
In a similar manner, to increases in GDP per capita, improvements
in socioeconomic conditions in source countries has a negative impact
on migration flows. The result implies that better economic institu-
tions in origin have a reducing effect on migration outflows. Among
the measures of the quality of political institutions, democratic ac-
countability significantly determines migration outflows. This result is
consistent with the effect of institutionalized democracy indicator that
is used in our baseline results (see column 1). Although some of the
variables carry the expected signs, across specifications, the impacts
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of most of the remaining economic and political institutions variables
are not statistically significant.25 Column 3 combines variables used in
column 1 and 2, but the democracy variable of column 1 is omitted to
avoid redundancy with democratic accountability. The results remain
generally similar to that of columns 1 and 2.
The results in columns 4 ´ 6 of Table 2.4 are obtained from the
same specifications as results in columns 1 ´ 3, but using the flow
of asylum seekers instead of regular migration flows as the dependent
variable. The results on the impact of political determinants on regular
migration flows remain valid for the flow of asylum seekers.
25The estimates for those political institutional variables remain insignificant
even if we include each of the institutional variables separately with the control
variables. These results are available upon request.
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2.4.5 Robustness checks: using the OLS estima-
tion
Given that our estimation model is a pseudo-gravity model, we use the
PPML estimator from Tables 2.2 to 2.4, which flexibly accounts for a
significant proportion of zero observations in the dependent variables.
In this section, we check for the robustness of the benchmark results by
performing OLS estimation on (2.2) using the positive migration flows
only, as in Ortega and Peri (2013). These results are documented in
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 in Subsection 2.6.3. For each specification both
the source-country fixed effects pαsq and time-destination fixed effects
pαdtq are included.
Tables 2.9 and 2.10, respectively, reveal the estimation results ob-
tained when zero bilateral regular and asylum seeker migration flows
are omitted. In both cases, GDP per capita in source and destination
countries, civil conflict, institutional autocracy and ethnic distribu-
tional indexes, political stability (both in source and the destination
countries), socioeconomic conditions, law and order, bureaucracy qual-
ity as well as the control variables display effects that are qualitatively
similar to our baseline results in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Furthermore, in
the linear estimation, the civil liberty parameter of the source country
significantly affects migration flows.
Another robustness check involves using the PPML estimator as in
Tables 2.2 and 2.3, but re-estimating the models by gradually increas-
ing the number of political determinants of migration. This is meant
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to check if our main estimation results are affected by the fairly large
number of explanatory variables we considered. In doing so, the Tables
2.11 and 2.12 depict a remarkable degree of robustness to progressively
include political drivers of migration. For instance, GDP per capita
in the source country has a significantly negative impact on migration
flows from Africa to Europe although the coefficient on GDP per capita
of the source country decreases in absolute terms from -0.185 in the
most parsimonious specification to -0.140 in the most comprehensive
model in Table 2.2. Similarly, the incidence of civil conflicts has a ro-
bust positive effect on migration flows, and the magnitude of its impact
remains largely unaffected by the inclusion of additional explanatory
variables. The same can be said of the effects of democracy score,
distance, common legislation, common language, colonial ties, migrant
networks and hegemony. The only exception is the measure of civil
liberties in source country, which always carries a negative coefficient,
but becomes statistically significant in only one of the specifications.
2.5 Conclusions
The current migration and refugee crisis in Europe requires an un-
derstanding of the different migration drivers beyond the well-known
economic determinants. While a few extant studies have examined
determinants of African migration flows, they have, however, either
focused exclusively on intra-African migration flows or studied inter-
national migration from Africa together with intra-African flows.
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The present study aims to fill this gap in the literature by pro-
viding a thorough empirical examination of the role played by human
security factors in explaining trends in African migration to Europe
during the period 1990–2014. To estimate the pseudo-gravity model
of bilateral migration flows, we employ the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) estimator, which is particularly suitable in regres-
sions where the dependent variable has a significant proportion of zero
values (Beine and Parsons, 2015). This study contributes to the lit-
erature on the determinants of international migration flows in two
ways.
First, as aforementioned, we empirically analyze the specific Africa
to Europe trends of migration flows. From the perspective of Euro-
pean destination countries, African migration flows show a dramatic
rise and curbing this flow is among the top policy issues. From the view
of African source countries, Europe continues to be an important desti-
nation for extra-continental African migrants, thanks to the historical
and geopolitical ties between the two continents. Hence, this emphasis
helps us to highlight essential determinants of migration flows from
Africa to Europe.
Second, although the importance of non-economic factors such as
civil wars and conflicts in international migration is well-documented
in the literature (Naudé, 2010; Docquier et al., 2018), the present paper
additionally highlights the roles of institutions and social heterogene-
ity indicators such as ethnic polarization and religious tension in the
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decisions of individuals to emigrate.
Extra-continental migration is not only costly but it is also risky.
Hence, despite abject poverty, wars, civil conflicts, severe political per-
secution, and human rights abuses, the majority of the world popula-
tion stays at home or moves mainly to neighboring countries in their
search for safety and protection. Our analysis underscores that, in ad-
dition to the obvious economic determinants and violent conflicts, a
combination of several push and pull factors including political condi-
tions (ongoing violence and instability, low institutional quality) and
pre-existing socio-cultural structures influence the migration choice of
individuals.
We find several notable results. First, most of the human security
indicators significantly determine annual migration flows from Africa
into European countries. Per capita income growth in a given Eu-
ropean destination is associated with an increase in immigrant flows
while per capita income growth in a given source country is negatively
related with emigration from Africa. Rising political persecution, hu-
man right violations, political instability and civil conflicts in source
countries are also associated with increased migration flows into Eu-
ropean destination countries. Second, in conjunction with the regular
trends of migration flows, asylum seekers from Africa also have a com-
bination of political and economic motivations to claim refugee status.
Hence, categorizing African immigrants as “ bogus asylum seekers”, in
general terms would be highly misleading and could result in misguided
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migration policies. Third, cultural and migration cost-related factors,
such as migrant networks, colonial ties, common languages, physical
distance and living in a land-locked country have shown significant
effects on trends in African migration to Europe.
The aforementioned findings have significant policy implications
for managing the recent migration and refugee crisis in Europe. The
African migration flows to Europe are complex and driven by mixed
push and pull factors. The central point of this discussion is acknowl-
edging the heterogeneity of the flows, since a valid response will need
to be grounded in a sound understanding of fundamental causes of the
flows.
Further,the motives, patterns and trends of African migrants’ should
be seen from the broader human security point of view. Overlooking
the political factors, which significantly influence international migra-
tion, and attempting to address only the economic causes through
investing in Africa, may have counterproductive consequences. There-
fore, the collaboration among African source countries and all Euro-
pean countries and institutions should be based not only on the eco-
nomic development of the source countries, but also on the promotion
of human security: peace, human rights, democracy, and social stabil-
ity.
Finally, it is noteworthy that, although our main result—that broader
human security factors drive international migration—is based on data
on trends in African migration to Europe in the post-Cold War period,
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it appears to be generalizable to the rest of the world for three main
reasons. First, there are already studies on other parts of the world
that have found violent conflicts as a significant driver of emigration
(Clemens, 2017; Shrestha, 2017). Second, the frequency and severity
of violent conflicts and human rights abuses in some parts of the world,
especially the Middle East, are as high as, if not higher than, in Africa.
This also makes human security factors potentially important drivers
of emigration from other conflict-ridden regions, such as the Middle
East. Third, although the post-Cold War period is a period when
Africa has witnessed some of the most violent conflicts in the world
(e.g., Rwanda, Congo, Liberia), this is, at the same time, a period
during which several African countries experienced peaceful transfers
of power (e.g., Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania). Hence, our results
may be also applied to politically stable emerging economies in Asia
and Latin America.
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2.6.1 Migration Model theoretical background
As aforementioned, economic deprivation, political persecution, poor
governance, ethnic tension, structural violence and conflicts in the
source countries are considered as the main factors of migration decision-
making. Additionally, economic, social and political enabling environ-
ments in host countries are taken as pull factors. In this sense, De Haas
(2011) strongly argues that ‘on the macro-level, migration processes are
driven by a multitude of economic and non-economic factors and, on
the micro-level, migrants are motivated by a combination of multiple,
interconnected but analytically distinct social, cultural, economic and
political factors.’ Therefore, migration decisions should be viewed as
a process of location choices (staying at home or moving to an optimal
destination) in which individuals form expectations about where they
will have better opportunities and protections, in order to maximize
their utility.
Accordingly, taking as a starting point the random utility maxi-
mization (RUM) theoretical models developed by Beine et al. (2011),
Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Ortega and Peri (2013), in which in-
come maximization problems or wage differentials are a driving force
to make a migration decision, we emphasize the broader human secu-
rity conditions. Specifically, we analyze a more substantial number of
political and socio-cultural factors that may influence the individual’s
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decision to move from his/her current location. Furthermore, instead
of considering a unique destination, our model considers multiple des-
tinations.
Formally, out of the set of N global countries, the individual i from
his source country s P S “ s1, s2......sn, where S Ď N , makes a decision
of whether to stay in s or to migrate to the destination country d P
D “ d1, d2...dn, where D Ď N . It is noteworthy note that as indicated
in Kennan and Walker (2013) among others, individuals are assumed
to have rational expectations. Thus, they make an informed decision to
migrate in seeking their maximum utility. Therefore, following Ortega
and Peri (2013), we formulate a utility function u of the individual i
by staying in the source-country s or by migrating into the destination
country d that are given by (2.4) and (2.5), respectively,
ussi “ γss ` πss ` νssi, (2.4)
usdi “ γsd ` πsd ` νsdi. (2.5)
The terms γsspγsdq and πsspπsdq are country-of-source (country-of-
destination) specific variables, which capture the average earnings and
security of individual i by staying in home country s (leaving for des-
tination country d), respectively. Furthermore, the individual-specific
terms νssi and νsdi denote unobserved components of an individual’s
utility in each source and destination country, respectively. These ran-
dom variables νssi and νsdi are assumed to be identically and inde-
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pendently distributed as type-I extreme values across locations and
periods.
Migration costs also determine the magnitude of utility for a mi-
grating individual. Let Csdi denote the total cost of migration from
country s to country d for individual i. These relocation costs are also
influenced by specific features between the source and host countries
such as culture, language, geographic distance, and the attractiveness
or accessibility and entry policies of host-countries (Ortega and Peri,
2009; Beine et al., 2016 and Bertoli and Moraga, 2015).26.
Therefore, each individual acts to maximize the expected present
value of the realized payoffs, net of moving costs. For this minimiza-
tion, we consider that
γsd “ h1pWdiq ´ Csdi
and
πsd “ h2pFdiq ´ Csdi,
where Wdi is the present value of expected earnings in the form of wage,
and Fdi is the level of freedom that an individual i enjoys by staying in
26Besides, Grogger and Hanson (2011) designate two components of migration
costs: a fixed monetary cost of moving from country s to d, ksd, and a cost that
varies as per the individual's character,
j
lsd, where (j) denotes individual's skills,
such that Csdi “ ksd `
j
lsd. Moreover, the migration costs also have various time
and destination dimensions, which could be time-invariant (such as geographic
and cultural distance) or time-varying and destination-specific (such as migration
policies and the benevolence of the welfare state) (Beine and Parsons, 2015).
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the destination country d. Note that the probability of an individual
immigrant settling in the destination country with the expected human
security gains depends on the socio-economic and political stability of
the destination country.27 Thus, to capture this situation, we introduce
a binary function λp$, fq, where $ is employment probability, and
f denotes the chances of individual i being protected by moving to
country d. Accordingly, λp$, fq “ 0, if the individual migrant is not
employed or does not get the expected protection and security; and,
λp$, fq “ 1, if the migrant individual gets employed and enjoys legal
and political protections in the hosting country. Henceforth, the utility
function following Ortega and Peri (2013) is formally represented as
usdi “ λp$, fqph1pWdiq ` h2pFdiqq ` νsdi
It is noteworthy that a fairly general stochastic specification is con-
sidered in the above equations. The rationale behind this assumption
is that there would be expected differences between prospective mi-
grants and non-migrants. However, in many aspects, it is difficult
to measure these differences since prospective migrants may differ in
their talents, attitudes toward risk, financial liquidity and insurance,
human rights abuses, psychological costs of living abroad, etc. (Ken-
27Extensive hostility, abuse of and violence against migrants has become much
more visible worldwide in recent years (Taran, 2001). Current human rights re-
ports show that racist and xenophobic speech and violence, harassment, threats
and killings targeting asylum seekers and migrants are increasing across the Euro-
pean Union. These crimes against migrants are committed organized way by state
authorities, private companies or individuals or vigilante groups.
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nan and Walker, 2013, Ortega and Peri, 2013). Note that νssi “ εssi
is a stochastic term for the stay-at-home utility function. However,
for each d P Ds, the term νsdi comprises two uncorrelated error terms:
νsdi “ ζ ` εsdi, where ζ is drawn from a probability distribution with
mean zero. These individual random effects are correlated, i.e., utility
of migrants in a given destination country can interact. The random
variables εssi and εsdi are all identically and independently distributed
as type-I extreme value. Using the nested logit model approach of Mc-
Fadden (1978), which allows for more general substitution patterns,
it is possible to get a closed-form solution for choice probabilities of
staying in the source country pPsq or migrating to the destination pPdq.













where T is a discordance parameter and controls for the degree of
correlation across the stochastic terms in the equations. As Ortega and
Peri (2013) argue, the setting T “ 1 coincides with zero correlation,
which obtains an expression for the log odds ratio of the logit model.
Assuming that there will be a non-negative correlation in the error
terms in our destination equations, then T will take a value 0 ă T ă 1.
The probability of an individual migrating from the source country
s to the destination country d is given by
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Accordingly, the odds ratios between staying in a home country
and migrating into a destination country (lnPd
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The migrants’ decision to move to two different destination coun-
tries depends on the relative attractiveness of the destinations. Hence,









The proportion of people who choose to migrate into destination
country d as compared to the total number of potential migrants from




nsqq, where nsq is the
number of individuals born in country s who decided to live in country
q. Following this logic, we can rewrite (2.8) as
lnpnsdq “ lnpnssq `
γsd ` πsd
T
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It is noteworthy that in the above equation, all quantities in the
right-hand-side, except γsd ` πsd, are constant across destinations and
vary by the source country only. By considering variations over time,
individual migrants may be exposed to different levels of economic ben-
efits and social, legal and political protections in different destination
countries. Furthermore, to deal with a time-specific migration choice
decision (as a consequence of the relative attractiveness of the desti-
nation countries and the proportion of migration flows towards these












In a similar way, the share of people who choose to stay in the home





Then, the probability of individuals staying in the source country over
multiple periods, given the pushing factors from the home country and
the potential probability to migrate into d, is given by










Therefore, our empirical specification, which is specified in section
two of this chapter is obtained from (2.11) and (2.12) is formally given
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as
lnpnsdtq “ β0sdt ` β1γsdt ` β2πsdt ` εsdt, (2.13)
where β0sdt stands for source-by-year and destination-by-year fixed
effects, which vary over time and by countries of source and desti-
nation. The term εsdt is an error term capturing various unobserved
factors of the approximate probabilities in the estimation sample. The
empirical specification in (2.13) is similar to a pseudo-gravity model
of international migration, which considers the logarithm of bilateral
migration flows as a function of country fixed effects with respect to
source and destination countries and general migration costs (see, for
example, Mayda, 2010, Bertoli and Moraga, 2013, Ortega and Peri,
2013, McKenzie et al., 2014, Beine et al., 2016).
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2.6.2 Trends in African migration flows
Figure 2.1: Absolute number of African regular migration flows towards Europe in 1990, 1995,
2000, 2005, 2010, 2014. Note that there are two distinct scales for the colors: one scale for the
upper three maps and another scale for the lower three maps. Source: Authors’ calculations based
on data described in the text.
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Figure 2.2: Absolute number of African asylum seekers in Europe in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005,
2010, 2014. Note that there are two distinct scales for the colors: one scale for the upper three
maps and another scale for the lower three maps. Source: Authors’ calculations based on data
described in the text.
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2.6.3 Data details and results of further estima-
tions
Table 2.5: List of African countries of sources of migrants and asylum seekers
Code country code country code country code country
1 Algeria 16 Egypt 31 Mali 46 Tunisia
2 Angola 17 Equatorial Guinea 32 Mozambique 47 Tanzania
3 Burundi 18 Eritrea 33 Mauritania 48 South Africa
4 Benin 19 Ethiopia 34 Mauritius 49 Uganda
5 Burkina Faso 20 Gabon 35 Malawi 50 Zambia
6 Botswana 21 Ghana 36 Namibia 51 Zimbabwe
7 Chad 22 Guinea 37 Niger
8 Central AR 23 Gambia 38 Nigeria
9 Côte d’Ivoire 24 Guinea-Bissau 39 Rwanda
10 Cameroon 25 Kenya 40 Sudan
11 Congo, DR 26 Liberia 41 Senegal
12 Congo 27 Libya 42 Sierra Leone
13 Comoros 28 Lesotho 43 Somalia
14 Cape Verde 29 Morocco 44 Seychelles
15 Djibouti 30 Madagascar 45 Togo
Table 2.6: List of European countries of destinations for African migrants
Code country code country code country
1 Austria 8 Greece 15 Norway
2 Belgium 9 Hungary 16 Poland
3 Czech Republic 10 Iceland 17 Portugal
4 Denmark 11 Ireland 18 Spain
5 Finland 12 Italy 19 Sweden
6 France 13 Luxembourg 20 Switzerland
7 Germany 14 Netherlands 21 United Kingdom
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Overview. This chapter examines the joint impact of infrastructure
capital and institutional quality on economic growth using a large panel
dataset covering 120 countries and spanning the years 1980´2015. The
empirical strategy involves estimating a simple growth model where,
in addition to standard controls, infrastructure, institutional quality
and their interaction are included as explanatory variables. Potential
endogeneity concerns are addressed by means of Generalised Method
of Moments (GMM) estimators that utilize internal instruments. We
find that the interaction terms between infrastructure capital and in-
179
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stitutional quality have a positive and significant impact on economic
growth. These results are robust to a variety of alternative specifica-
tions and institutional quality measures. Hence, our results suggest
that maximizing returns from infrastructure development requires im-
proving the quality of institutions.
Keywords: infrastructure; institutions; growth; dynamic panel
3.1 Introduction
Physical infrastructure assets such as roads, electrical grid, telecommu-
nication networks, water supply, and waste disposal provide services
are central to the functioning of modern economies (Palei, 2015). Be-
yond being one of the most essential inputs in the process of economic
growth, the supply of efficient public infrastructure improves quality of
life as well as being critical for national security (Baldwin and Dixon,
2008). As a consequence of sustained economic development, popula-
tion pressure and rapid advances in science and technology in the past
century, infrastructure capital has become highly diverse and broadly
tuned meaning that improving the quality and quantity of infrastruc-
ture capital as a vital factor of production has become an integral part
of sustainable development policies.
A significant body of academic literature has focused on the con-
tributions of infrastructure capital to aggregate output, productivity
and welfare. Often, such studies discuss these contributions in terms
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of the growth effects of productive government spending models (see,
for instance, Barro, 1990; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1997; Ghosh and
Roy, 2004). Moreover, following the seminal work of Aschauer (1989),
a growing interest in empirically investigating the link between infras-
tructure capital and economic growth has been observed. (see, e.g.,
Canning and Pedroni, 1999; Bougheas et al., 2000; Röller and Waver-
man, 2001; Calderón and Servén, 2004; Calderón et al., 2015). Despite
using a variety of datasets and empirical methodologies, most of these
empirical studies document a generally positive correlation and long-
run effect of physical infrastructure on aggregate output and produc-
tivity (Munnell et al., 1990; Fernald, 1999; Calderón and Servén, 2004;
Fedderke et al., 2006; Torrisi, 2010).
Similar to infrastructure capital, the role of institutional quality as
a determinant of economic performance has also received increasing at-
tention in empirical growth studies conducted in the past three decades
(see, among others, North, 1991; Coase, 1992; Ostrom et al., 1993; Ro-
drik, 2003). These studies have served to convincingly demonstrate
that general differences in institutional quality are serves as one of
the most reliable determinants of variations in economic development
among countries (Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Acemoglu
et al., 2008; Lee and Kim, 2009; Valeriani et al., 2011; Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2013; Law et al., 2013). More particularly, the protection of
civil and property rights, economic and political freedom, law and or-
der, bureaucratic quality and low levels of corruption have been shown
to be associated with higher rates of economic growth (Bénassy-Quéré
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et al., 2007).
While large bodies of empirical literature have examined the sepa-
rate roles of infrastructure capital and institutional quality in economic
development, existing cross-country studies pay surprisingly little at-
tention to the complementarities between infrastructural and institu-
tional capability as it relates to their effects on economic growth. The
few exceptions to this generalization include Esfahani and Ramırez
(2003), Maiorano and Stern (2007) and Andonova and Diaz-Serrano
(2009). Using a cross-country study and a structural model of in-
frastructure, Esfahani and Ramırez (2003) document the crucial role
of generic institutional capabilities as an indicator of the credibility
and effectiveness of government’s toward enabling high infrastructure
returns. However, these authors employed pure cross-sectional regres-
sions that are known to suffer from endogeneity biases. Another study,
conducted by Maiorano and Stern (2007) find that regulatory institu-
tions have a positive effect on mobile telecommunication infrastructure
and on the levels of per capita GDP. Despite using narrow measures of
infrastructure capital and institutional quality, the study by Maiorano
and Stern (2007) suggests a potentially positive joint impact of infras-
tructure and institutions on economic growth. A similar study by An-
donova and Diaz-Serrano (2009) also serves to demonstrate that while
political institutions are essential to the development of telecommu-
nications infrastructure, their effect is limited, as mobile technologies
are less dependent on political constraints. Conversely, bad institutions
are often considered to be behind the weak economic performances of
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infrastructural projects, particularly in developing economies (Aron,
2000; Chang, 2011). Among other indicators, a lower quality of in-
frastructure is associated with corruption across a range of economies
(Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998; Dal Bó and Rossi, 2007; Gillanders, 2014;
Corrado and Rossetti, 2018). In addition, when governments are weak
in regard to implementing infrastructural investments, or when they
apply excessive interventions, potential gains from infrastructure in-
vestments might be suppressed or appropriated (Straub, 2011).
The present study aims to reassess the role of infrastructure capital
in economic growth under varying degrees of institutional quality.1 In
this context, while infrastructure capital is considered as a physical
core, institutional quality can be viewed as a soft component in shap-
ing growth patterns.2 Hence, the first contribution of this chapter is to
revisit the joint impact of infrastructure capital and institutional qual-
ity using a new dataset that consists of several alternative measures
for both variables. We employ a balanced dataset of 120 countries
spanning the period 1980–2015.
The second contribution of this chapter concerns the estimation
methodology. Empirical growth models often include lagged depen-
dent variables as a covariate to control for the convergence effect. This
creates an endogeneity problem, as the lagged dependent variable will
1In this chapter we consider the basic physical capital stocks, using electric
power generation and telecommunication subscriptions as proxies for infrastructure
assets.
2In our model, infrastructure capital is taken as a crucial treatment variable,
while institutional quality is a moderator.
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be–by construction–correlated with the unobserved country-specific ef-
fects (Caselli et al., 1996). Earlier studies on institutions and infras-
tructure, such as Esfahani and Ramırez (2003) and Law et al. (2013),
use cross-sectional regressions and apply an instrumental variable ap-
proach to address the endogeneity problem. However, implementing
an instrumental variables estimation approach is often challenging as
it is difficult to find a reliable instrumental variable for infrastructure
capital and institutional quality (Lee and Kim, 2009). Our second
contribution is thus to provide more reliable results by addressing the
endogeneity problem through the system Generalised Method of Mo-
ments (system-GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bover (1995); Blundell
and Bond (1998); Bond et al. (2001)). This estimator is well suited to
account for the potential endogeneity of not only the lagged dependent
variable, but also of other explanatory variables.
As a third contribution, this chapter improves upon extant studies
on the joint effects of infrastructure and institutions, such as Esfa-
hani and Ramırez (2003), Maiorano and Stern (2007) and Andonova
and Diaz-Serrano (2009), by employing a large spectrum of institu-
tional quality indicators, including democracy, autocracy, executive
constraints, and bureaucratic quality, government stability, control
over corruption, and the rule of law. These indicators capture three
different dimensions of political institutions: political stability, admin-
istrative quality and democratic accountability. With these contribu-
tions in mind this study seeks to help better understand the extent
to which the effects of infrastructure capital on economic growth are
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affected with respect to varying institutional qualities. This will, for
instance, allow us to check whether promoting democracy is more im-
portant than controlling corruption in enhancing the productivity of
infrastructural projects.
Our results reveal that infrastructure capital is positively and signif-
icantly correlated with economic growth in countries with higher insti-
tutional qualities, and vice versa. In particular, infrastructure capital
affects economic growth positively and significantly in the presence of
considerably better institutional frameworks such as democracy, law
and order, control of corruption, bureaucratic qualities and govern-
ment stability. On the contrary, weaker institutional setups, such as
autocracy, diminish the growth impacts of infrastructure capital. Our
results are robust to the use of various alternative specifications and
estimation methods. These results suggest that improving the quality
of institutions is essential to reap the full economic benefits of infras-
tructural investments.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 intro-
duces the empirical specification of our model. Section 3.3 describes
our data in detail. Section 3.4 provides the results and Section 3.5
contains the conclusion. Finally, section 3.6 provides supplementary
material.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HETEROGENEITY, MIGRATION, AND INSTITUTIONS 
Yitagesu Zewdu  Zergawu 
 
186 Chapter 3: Institutions on Economic Growth
3.2 Empirical Model Specification
In our quest to examine the role of infrastructure capital on economic
growth under varying degrees of institutional quality (henceforth we
use the word “institutions” and “institutional quality” alternatively),
we employ theoretical models that link economic growth with rent-
seeking models. Specifically, our model builds up on the endogenous
growth model of Barro (1990), which incorporates infrastructure cap-
ital as one factor of production. It bears noting here that infrastruc-
tural investments are highly vulnerable to substantial bribes and rent-
seeking activities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Hence, weak institu-
tional setups may lead to lower quality of infrastructural investments
and hence slow the rate of economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1995;
Mauro, 1997). Alternatively, institutional quality is expected to have
a direct effect on growth because it affects the efficiency of infrastruc-
tural investments. This view is echoed by, among others, Chong and
Gradstein (2007), who argue that weak institutions divert resources
from productive to unproductive sectors and encourage rent-seeking
behaviors.
Our empirical model is derived from Canning and Pedroni (2008),
who, following Barro (1990), incorporate stochastic disturbance terms
over time. Such an approach allows us to estimate the role of in-
frastructure capital in a reduced form growth model using panel data
estimation techniques. Specifically, our theoretical model describes the
long-run growth rate of output per capita as a function of infrastruc-
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ture capital and institutions.3 Formally, our model, after a logarithmic
transformation, is written as
9yit “ α ` θGit ` γIit ` σIit ˚Git, (3.1)
where 9yit denotes the GDP per capita growth rate for country i at time
period t, Iit represents an indicator of institutional quality, Git stands
for infrastructural capital, and Iit ˚Git is the interaction term between
institutions and infrastructure.
Our empirical model follows from (3.1) and looks as follows:
9yit “ α ` θGit ` γIit ` σIit ˚Git ` λZit ` εit, (3.2)
where Zit is a vector of control variables and εit is the error term.
In this model the marginal effect (ME) of Git on 9yit is given by:
MEpGit | Iitq “
B 9yit
BGit
“ θ ` σIit (3.3)
In (3.3) unless σ is zero, the marginal effect of Git is conditional on
the value of Iit. Since we have a symmetric interactive model specifi-
cation in (3.2), the marginal effect of Iit on 9yit is also conditional on
Git, i.e.,
MEpIit | Gitq “
B 9yit
BIit
“ γ ` σGit. (3.4)
3Subsection 3.6.1, in the Appendix, provides a detailed theoretical discussion of
the model.
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Thus, the coefficient of the interaction term, σ, indicates both the
slope of the relationship between MEpGit | Iitq and Iit, and the slope
of the relationship between MEpIit | Gitq and Git (Berry et al., 2012).
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
HInfrastructure|Institutions: The marginal effect of infrastructure cap-
ital on economic growth is expected to be positive in the presence
of a high level of institutional quality, and this positive effect is ex-
pected to strengthen as the institutional quality improves. Similarly,
the marginal effect of institutional quality is expected to be positive at
any non-zero level of infrastructure capital and the effect gets stronger
as infrastructure capital increases.
3.2.1 Dynamic panel data estimation approach
The empirical growth literature on the effects of infrastructure cap-
ital and institutional quality on economic growth has relied heavily
on pure cross-sectional estimation methods (see, e.g., Esfahani and
Ramırez, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004; and, Rodrik et al., 2004). Nonethe-
less, the pure cross-sectional estimations often suffer from endogene-
ity bias, which arises by construction from the correlation between
unobserved country-specific effects and the lagged dependent variable
(Caselli et al., 1996). Furthermore, reverse causality from determinants
of growth, such as infrastructure capital and institutional quality, to
economic growth could be another source of endogeneity and could
bias estimation results. To overcome these endogeneity concerns, an
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HETEROGENEITY, MIGRATION, AND INSTITUTIONS 
Yitagesu Zewdu  Zergawu 
 
3.2. Empirical Model Specification 189
instrumental variable approach could be employed. Nevertheless, it
is often difficult to find reliable instruments, which can be associated
with the explanatory variable, but not with the error term.
In the empirical growth literature, the General Method of Moments
(GMM)-based dynamic panel data estimators suggested by Arellano
and Bond (1991); Arellano and Bover (1995); and Blundell and Bond
(1998) are widely used to overcome the aforementioned econometric
challenges in pure cross-sectional growth regressions. It is notewor-
thy that these estimators address unobserved country heterogeneity,
omitted variable bias, and potential endogeneity that could arise from
reverse-causality, by removing country-specific effects through first-
differencing and employing lagged values as internal instruments (Arel-
lano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).
In this study, we employ the system-GMM estimator (Arellano and
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) to examine the effects of in-
frastructure capital and institutional quality on aggregate output. We
employ a panel data set of 120 countries over the period 1980´ 2014,
with data averaged over five-years periods to overcome business cycle
effects. Our baseline model is a multiplicative interaction model, which
is derived from (3.2):




where yit´1 is log GDP per capita of the previous five-year period
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and µi denotes the unobserved country-specific fixed effect. In (3.5) the
interaction term allows the marginal effect of infrastructure capital on
economic growth to vary with different degrees of institutional quality.
Unlike the difference-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991),
which employs equations in first differences, the system-GMM estima-
tor uses a system of two equations: one in first differences and the
other in levels. The variables in levels in the latter are instrumented
with their first differences, and these additional instruments reduce
small sample biases and imprecision associated with the difference-
GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998;
Roodman, 2006).
To test if our model is correctly specified, we apply two tests,
namely the overidentification test, and the test for deeper lag serial
correlation of the residuals in the differenced equation. Under the null
hypothesis of instrument validity, the Sargan/Hansen tests for over-
identifying restrictions are asymptotically distributed as a Chi-squared
random variable with degrees of freedom equal to the number of in-
struments less the number of parameters. The autocorrelation test
determines the presence of autocorrelation of order three in the resid-
uals in first differences, which is equivalent to testing autocorrelation
of order two in the residuals in levels.
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3.3 Data Description
As stated above, our goal in this chapter is to estimate the effect of
infrastructure capital, institutional quality and their interaction on ag-
gregate economic growth worldwide. To this end we employ a balanced
panel dataset that covers 120 countries over the period 1980 ´ 2015.
The list of the sample countries covered by the study is provided in
Table 3.8. The variables used in the model and the source of data
are briefly discussed below while summary statistics are documented
in 3.1.
The dependent variable is the growth rate of aggregate output of
a country. Aggregate output is measured by gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita in constant 2010 US dollars. The data are obtained
from the World Bank Development Indicators database (World-Bank,
2017).
One of the main challenges associated with research on infrastruc-
ture and growth is obtaining quality national-level data on infrastruc-
ture capital. Sector-specific physical infrastructure data on investment
or capital stock volumes are available only for a handful of high-income
economies, and usually for just a few years. As a result of the incom-
plete nature of the data for other sectors of infrastructural investments,
such as road networks, airports, and irrigation, we have opted here to
focus on telephone and power production infrastructure.
Accordingly, we use fixed telephone subscriptions per 100 people
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and the aggregate electric power generation kilowatt-hours (kWh) per
capita as proxies for infrastructure capital investment. As a partic-
ular merit of these indicators, telephone networks and electric power
generation are major contentious issues in the political economy of
infrastructure development in many countries, and their productivity
could be strongly influenced by the quality of prevailing institutions
(Esfahani and Ramırez, 2003).
Fixed telephone subscriptions refer to the sum of an active num-
ber of analog fixed telephone lines, voice-over-IP (VoIP) subscriptions,
fixed wireless local loop (WLL) subscriptions, ISDN voice-channel
equivalents and fixed public payphones. Alternatively we use the tele-
phone data from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS)
(Banks, 2011), which consolidates fixed line and cellular telephones.
Our data on electric power generation comes from the U.S.-Energy-
Information-Administration (2017), which provides access to a wide
range of global energy and climate statistics. The dataset provides
electricity generation by energy sources such as oil, nuclear, hydro-
electric, gas, coal, and others. For this study, we use the aggregated
data from all sources in kWh for each country, divided by the total
population of the country.
To measure institutional quality, we rely on two primary sources.
First, we use the political institution indicators from the Polity IV
Project dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). Second, we employ the
political risk index of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
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dataset, which provides survey-based data on the rule of law, control
of corruption, bureaucratic quality, and government stability (How-
ell, 2011). A brief description of the individual institutional quality
indicators used in the current study is provided below:
• Polity2: This is a combination of institutionalized democracy
and institutionalized autocracy. The Polity2 score, which is de-
rived from the Polity IV Dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002),
is computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democ-
racy score. The resulting unified Polity2 scale ranges from +10
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).
• Executive constraints: This refers to the extent of institu-
tionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief ex-
ecutives, whether individuals or collectives, where any “account-
ability group may impose such limitations.” This variable, which
is also from the Polity IV Dataset, ranges from one to seven,
wherein the larger the value, the larger the degree of constraints
on the executive.
• Institutionalized democracy: This measure covers three as-
pects: piq the presence of institutions and procedures through
which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative
policies and leaders; piiq the existence of institutionalized con-
straints on the exercise of power by the executive; and piiiq the
guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and
acts of political participation. This variable, which is drawn from
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the Polity IV Dataset, ranges from zero to ten, wherein the larger
the value, the larger the degree of institutionalized democracy.
• Institutionalized autocracy: This measure defines the pres-
ence of a distinctive set of political characteristics including: piq
the competitiveness of political participation; piiq the regulation
of political participation; piiiq the openness and competitiveness
of executive recruitment; and pivq constraints on the chief ex-
ecutive. This variable, which is also taken from the Polity IV
Dataset, ranges from zero to ten, wherein the larger the value,
the larger the degree of institutionalized autocracy.
• Bureaucracy quality: This index measures the degree to which
the bureaucracy minimizes policy revisions when governments
change. Therefore, this measure of shock absorption takes on
larger points for countries where the bureaucracy has the strength
and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or in-
terruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries,
the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political
pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment
and training and it ranges from zero to four, wherein the larger
the value, the lower the risk. The related data come from the
International Country Risk Guide (Howell, 2011).
• Rule of law: This index, which is taken from the International
Country Risk Guide (Howell, 2011), measures the strength and
impartiality of the legal system. It ranges from zero to six,
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wherein the larger the value, the lower the risk.
• Control of corruption: This index (which comes from the In-
ternational Country Risk Guide (Howell, 2011) measures poten-
tial corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job
reservations, “scratching each other’s back”, secret party fund-
ing, and suspiciously close ties between politics and infrastructure
capital. It ranges from zero to six, wherein the larger the value,
the lower the control of corruption.4
• Government stability: This indicator is meant to assess both
the government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s), and
its ability to stay in office. We use data from the International
Country Risk Guide (Howell, 2011). The risk rating assigned is
the sum of three sub-components: government unity, legislative
strength, and popular support. Each of these items ranges from
zero to twelve, wherein the larger the value, the lower the risk.
In line with the empirical growth literature (see, for instance, Mankiw
et al., 1992; Barro and Lee, 1996; Sala-i Martin, 1997; Nawaz, 2015), we
use a vector of control variables including human capital, trade open-
ness, macroeconomic stability and growth rate of population in the
4The largest risk of corruption is that at some point it will become so over-
weening (or some major scandal will be suddenly revealed) as to provoke a popular
backlash, resulting in a fall or overthrow of the government, a major reorganization
or restructuring of the country's political institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown in
law and order, rendering the country ungovernable. Contract repudiation indicates
the risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of repudiation, postpone-
ment, or scaling down due to budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change
in government, or a change in government's economic and social policies.
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estimated equations. The data for all these control variables, except
the educational attainment, are obtained from the World Development
Indicators (World-Bank, 2017). The data on educational attainment
are drawn from Barro and Lee (2013).
Educational attainment is measured using average years of school-
ing of males and females above 25 years of age. Annual population
growth rate for year t is the exponential rate of growth of midyear
population from year t´ 1 to t, expressed as a percentage. The trade
openness of the sample countries is computed as the sum of imports
and exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP.
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3.4 Results
In this section we discuss estimation results of our empirical growth
models, where infrastructure, institutional quality and the interaction
of the two are our variables of interest. In particular, we first run
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions to explore the relationship
between economic growth and its determinants. Furthermore, we use
the fixed-effect (FE) model in order to exploit the panel dimension of
the data and tackle the cross-sectional heterogeneity. To overcome the
endogeneity problems associated with the dynamic nature of growth
models, we use the system-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991;
Blundell and Bond, 1998).
3.4.1 Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Estimations
Table 3.2 presents pooled OLS estimation results using annual eco-
nomic growth as a dependent variable and infrastructure and institu-
tional quality and their interactions as covariates of interest. In each
column, we include time dummies to account for time-effects. In all
the specifications, interaction terms between infrastructure and insti-
tutions are included. In particular, while columns 1, 2 and 3 consist of
the interaction between fixed telephone subscriptions per 100 people
(hereinafter telephone) and Polity2, columns 4, 5 and 6 include the
interaction terms between electric power generation in kWh per capita
(hereinafter electricity) and Polity2. In columns 2 and 5, we control
for population growth rate. In column 3 and 6, we add more growth
determinants that are standard in the growth literature.
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The results reveal that the interaction terms have the expected
positive sign throughout the specifications. These results are consistent
with our hypothesis that the marginal productivity of infrastructure
capital tends to be larger with better institutional quality. However,
these results should be taken with some caution as OLS in pooled
regressions neither addresses individual heterogeneity nor solves the
endogeneity of explanatory variables.
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 plot the marginal effect of infrastructure capital
on economic growth across the observed ranges of Polity2 based on the
estimates of column 3 and 6 of Table 3.2, respectively. They show that
the correlation between infrastructure capital and economic growth
is positive and statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval
across all levels of institutional quality. The converse result that the
marginal effect of institutional quality (Polity2) on economic growth
depends positively on telephone and electricity is shown by Figures 3.3
and 3.4 in Subsection 3.6.2 in the Appendix.
To avoid the possibility of modeling business cycle fluctuations, we
now exploit the time variation of the sample by splitting our 35 years
of data into 7 non-overlapping 5-year periods. Table 3.3, which is
structured similarly to Table 3.2, presents results for panel fixed-effect
regressions, and it includes the lag of GDP per capita as explonatory
variable.
Using five-year averages of annual economic growth as the depen-
dent variable, we examine the effects of infrastructure and institutions
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Figure 3.1: The effect of Polity2 on the marginal effects of telephone infrastructure on economic
growth. The graph is is derived from the OLS regression results documented in column 3 of Table
3.2.
Figure 3.2: The effect of Polity2 on the marginal effects of electric power infrastructure on
economic growth. The graph is derived from the OLS regression results documented in column 6
of Table 3.2.
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by means of the within estimator. As control variables, Table 3.3 addi-
tionally includes average years of secondary education in columns 2 and
5, and tertiary education in columns 3 and 6, respectively. Through-
out the specifications, the results indicate that the coefficients on the
interaction between infrastructure and institutions are positive and
statistically significant, at least at the 10% significance level.
In Table 3.3, the effects of education on growth are not statisti-
cally significant and are negative in some cases. These results may
be explained by noting that institutions and education are strongly
correlated (see, for instance, Glaeser et al., 2004 and Bhattacharyya,
2009). One can argue that a high correlation between the two pre-
dictors may induce multicollinearity, making it difficult to disentangle
separate effects. This result might also be interpreted from the point
of view of heterogeneity (Flachaire et al., 2014), since education and
institutions could have different effects on growth for different groups
of countries. Nevertheless, there are some cases where average years of
tertiary education is positive and highly significant.
In general, the results in Table 3.3 provide strong support for the
hypothesis that infrastructure capital is positively correlated with eco-
nomic growth given high-quality political institutions. Nonetheless,
these results should be interpreted with some care as the fixed effect
estimator suffers from endogeneity problems that arise from the corre-
lation between the lagged dependent variable and the country-specific
fixed effects.
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3.4.2 System-GMM estimation results
Next, Table 3.4 depicts results obtained by using the system-GMM dy-
namic panel data estimator, which addresses the problems of endoge-
nous explanatory variables and time-invariant omitted variables. This
estimator combines moment conditions for the model in first differences
with moment conditions for the model in levels. The table depicts re-
sults for two infrastructure capital indicators: telephone (columns 1, 2
and 3) and electricity (columns 4, 5 and 6). For all specifications, in-
stitutional quality is proxied by Polity2. Our main variable of interest
is the coefficient on the interaction term between infrastructure and
institutions, which turns out to be positive and statistically significant
in most of the specifications. The results confirm the presence of a
positive and statistically significant correlation between infrastructure
development and economic growth in the presence of democratic po-
litical regimes. The main difference between the fixed-effects results
in Table 3.3 and the system-GMM results in Table 3.4 is that the
effect of average years of tertiary education is not statistically signifi-
cant in the system-GMM estimation while it was significant in one of
the specifications in Table 3.3, generally depicting a weak relationship
between education and economic growth. Likewise, Acemoglu et al.
(2005) found that education measured by average years of schooling
has no explanatory power for institutions when country fixed effects
are included in the analysis.
In all of our specifications in Table 3.4, we use the two-step GMM
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procedure and employ the so-called Windmeijer finite sample correc-
tions on the standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005). As we are able to
reject autocorrelation of order two, but not one, we use the second
and third lags of the variables in levels as instruments for the equa-
tion in first differences. Hence, nowhere among the regressions did the
overidentification and AR2 test statistics show any evidence of poor
instrument choice or bad specification of the model at the 95% confi-
dence level.
In summary, estimation results imply that both infrastructure cap-
ital and institutional quality are important for economic growth even
after taking into account possible omitted variables and endogeneity
problems using GMM-based panel data estimators. Moreover, while it
is a common practice to consider the impacts of the two factors on eco-
nomic growth separately (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2005; Flachaire et al.,
2014; Calderón et al., 2015), our use of interaction terms yields inter-
esting results which confirm that the infrastructure and institutions
are complementary to each other in their effects on economic growth.
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3.4.3 Robustness checks
This section shows that our results are robust to the use of a variety
of alternative institutional quality measures and distinct indicators of
infrastructure capital.
i. Alternative institutional quality indicators
Acknowledging the potential limitations of relying on Polity2 as the
only measure of the quality of political institutions, we consider two
groups of alternative institutional quality indicators. The first group
consists of three indicators that are taken from the Polity IV Project
dataset while the second group includes four indicators from the Coun-
try Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset. Following Docquier et al. (2016), we
can classify these two datasets into de jure and de facto measures of
institutional quality. Accordingly, the “Polity2”, “democracy”, “au-
tocracy” and “executive constraints” are constructed based on expert
coding of legal documents and can therefore be interpreted more as de
jure measures. On the other hand, the “bureaucratic quality”, “rule of
law”, “control of corruption”, and “government stability” indices are
based largely on subjective analysis and can therefore be seen as de
facto measures of institutional quality.
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Table 3.5 documents system-GMM based results using three (de
jure) measures of the quality of political institutions, which are taken
from the Polity IV Project dataset. These alternative measures of po-
litical institutions are executive constraints (the degree of institution-
alized constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives),
institutional democracy and institutional autocracy. In columns 1 and
4 of Table 3.5, we report results on the interaction between executive
constraints and telephone and electricity, respectively. The results in-
dicate that infrastructure capital investment is positively and highly
correlated with economic growth, and the correlation becomes stronger
in the presence of executive accountability and political stability. As
already discussed, the Polity2 score as a parameter is constructed by
subtracting the institutionalized autocracy score of a country from its
institutionalized democracy score to generate an aggregate measure of
democracy that runs from -10 to 10.5 In order to see the robustness
of the results obtained using Polity2, we now decompose Polity2 into
democracy and autocracy. In columns 2 and 5 of Table 3.5 we con-
sider the interaction between telephone and institutionalized democ-
racy, and electricity and institutionalized democracy, respectively. The
results confirm that infrastructure capital investment has a positive
and robust effect on economic growth and the effect increases as the
democracy score improves. On the other hand, as results on columns
3 and 6 of Table 3.5 show, infrastructure capital positively affects eco-
5The Polity2 variable seemingly provides the political regime in events of “in-
terregnum” and “transition”.
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nomic growth, but the effect gets weaker as governments become more
autocratic. Therefore the results using disaggregated de jure insti-
tutional quality measures (Table 3.5) are qualitatively similar to the
baseline results obtained by using the comprehensive Polity2 measure
(Table 3.4).
We next turn to other alternative (de facto) measures of institu-
tional quality given in the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
dataset. Table 3.6 reports results for a similar set of estimations as in
Table 3.4, but with bureaucratic quality, the rule of law, government
stability and control of corruption as institutional quality indicators.
In most of the specifications of Table 3.6, the results on the interaction
between infrastructure capital and institutional quality are statistically
significant with the expected signs. The four measures of political in-
stitutions all exhibit the same pattern, with good political institutions
enhancing the effect of infrastructure capital on economic growth.
To sum up, our robustness analysis by means of alternative and
disaggregated measures of political institutions indicates that political
institutions play a crucial role in determining the effect of infrastruc-
ture capital on aggregate output.
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ii. Telephone subscription including cellular phones
Our next robustness check involves employing an alternative mea-
sure of the telephone infrastructure. Following the emergence of the in-
formation and communication technology (ICT), cellular phones have
become more popular since the 1990s.
In the baseline analysis, we used the fixed line telephone subscrip-
tions as a proxy for infrastructure capital. Table 3.7 estimates the
effect of institutions and infrastructure on economic growth by using
the total number of telephone subscriptions per capita (both fixed line
and cellular) as a proxy for infrastructure capital. The data for the
total number of telephone subscriptions per capita are drawn from
the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS) dataset. Re-
sults documented in Table 3.7 show that, except for columns 3 and 8,
the interaction terms between infrastructure and institutions have sta-
tistically significant effects with the expected signs. Therefore, these
results confirm the robustness of our baseline results to using a more
comprehensive telephone infrastructure indicator.
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3.5 Conclusion
The current study revisits the ongoing debate on the determinants
of long-run economic growth with a specific focus on the roles of in-
frastructure capital and political institutions. Our hypothesis is that
marginal effect of the infrastructure capital on economic growth de-
pends on the quality of existing political institutions, i.e., the better
the institutional quality, the larger the productivity of infrastructure.
In order to address potential econometric concerns with respect to en-
dogeneity and reverse causality, we verify our hypothesis not only by
means of the fixed-effects estimations, but also by using system-GMM
dynamic panel data estimations.
Our results show that there is a positive correlation between in-
frastructure capital and economic growth in countries with good in-
stitutional quality. On the other hand, the results indicate that the
productivity of infrastructure capital is not positively associated with
economic growth in countries where a highly autocratic regime is in
power. These results are robust to the use of different specifications
and estimators, and they are consistent with a variety of alternative
indicators of infrastructure (electric power generation and telecommu-
nication subscriptions) and political institutions (democracy, autoc-
racy, executive constraint, bureaucratic quality, the rule of law, and
government stability).
Our results confirm that the effect of infrastructure capital on ag-
gregate output depends on the quality of political institutions prevail-
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ing in a country. These results are in line with two potential explana-
tions. First, political institutions, even in the absence of a significant
direct effect (Flachaire et al., 2014), are a central element in the growth
process since they determine the marginal effect on economic growth
of standard growth determinants such as investment in infrastructure
capital. More precisely, countries with democratic institutional frame-
works (binding legislature) have a higher level of economic growth,
whereas authoritarian regimes (nonbinding legislatures) adversely af-
fect economic growth (Wright, 2008). Second, regulations are impor-
tant mechanisms to increase the productivity of public investments
as inefficiency is pervasive in public-owned investments. Dal Bó and
Rossi (2007) and Corrado and Rossetti (2018) show that a higher level
of corruption is strongly associated with a lower degree of efficiency in
using infrastructure capital. Moreover, when countries have a weaker
commitment to power and regulatory capacity, potential returns from
infrastructure might be lower due to weak contract enforcement, ex-
propriation, and opportunistic renegotiations (Straub, 2011).
Finally, note that the current study has the following limitations,
which will need to be addressed by future research. First, both the the-
oretical model and the empirical estimation do not address the issue of
infrastructure quality. Second, the study does not distinguish between
private and public ownership of the infrastructure capital. Third, due
to a lack of a sufficiently large panel data for other infrastructure sec-
tors, such as transportation, we only use the telephone subscriptions
and electric power generation as proxies for infrastructure capital.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical model builds up on the endogenous growth model of
Barro (1990), which incorporates infrastructure capital as one factor of
production. Additionally, following Canning and Pedroni (2008), we
specify a Cobb-Douglas type production function and apply the model








where the countries and time periods are indexed by i and t, respec-
tively. Aggregate output Y is produced by employing (non-infrastructure)
aggregate capital stock K, infrastructure capital stock G, aggregate
hours worked by the labor force L, and total factor of productivity A.
For simplicity, it is assumed that infrastructure capital is a fixed frac-
tion τit of total savings s. It can be shown that there is a growth and
welfare-maximizing level of investment in the infrastructure capital τ˚
(Canning and Pedroni, 2008; Straub, 2011). Note that, without shocks
in infrastructure capital, given by τ˚ “ β | α ` β (Barro, 1990).
Furthermore, Canning and Pedroni (2008) show that the proportion
of investment going to infrastructure is τit “ τ̄ `µit where µit is a zero
mean stationary series. Accordingly, in the endogenous growth model,
a positive shock to the infrastructure capital will increase income per
capita when τ̄ ă τ˚ and income per capita will decrease when τ̄ ą
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τ˚.6 The marginal cost of the increased infrastructure capital is the
diversion of resources from other productive sectors, while the marginal
benefit is the gain in the long-run income (Straub, 2011).
However, Aron (2000) argues that in growth models, the presence
of threshold levels of certain inputs such as infrastructure must be in
place before production is feasible. Hence, the constant returns to scale
assumption may not be satisfied. Thus, the effect of infrastructure
capital on output can be dependent on country-specific institutional
variables.
To capture this notion, we redefine the production function speci-
fied in the above equation by including rent-seeking activities that act
as a distortion in the production process. Our new production function
model is adapted from Nawaz et al. (2014), and given as







where ηit P r0, η̂s, η̂ ! 1 denotes rent-seeking behavior.
In our model, institutional quality is captured by rent-seeking as
a proxy. Formally, η̂ is the point at which rent-seeking is the highest
(institutional quality is the lowest).
We assume that each firm uses all its capacity to appropriate as
much rent as possible, which is dependent on the total amount of rent
6Canning and Pedroni (2008) complement the model by describing the evolution
of the technical progress, Ait, the share of investment going to infrastructure, τ ,
and the size of the workforce, Lit.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HETEROGENEITY, MIGRATION, AND INSTITUTIONS 
Yitagesu Zewdu  Zergawu 
 
226 Chapter 3: Institutions on Economic Growth
and the quality of institutions. When rit “ 0, it indicates the presence
of high institutional quality, whereby an agent extracts less rent. On
the contrary, when rit “ 1, institutional quality hits its lowest level,
and hence, the marginal utility of rent-seeking reaches its maximum
(Nawaz et al., 2014). Thus, the level of rit determines the marginal
productivity of infrastructural investment.
In contrast, good institutional quality improves the efficiency of in-
frastructure capital as resources are prevented from being wasted in
rent-seeking activities, so they lead to higher economic growth. Fur-
thermore, to predict the long-run growth patterns, it is important to
test the consumption and investment decisions made by individual
agents. In doing so, we assume that a representative agent is fac-
ing an infinite planning horizon and maximizing utility subject to a
dynamic budget constraint. As a result, the agent seeks to maximize








where Cit denotes consumption per capita, and we assume that 0 ă
σ ă 1. This implies that the elasticity of marginal utility equals the
constant ´σ. Moreover, e´ρt represents the time preference rate, where
ρ ą 0 is a time discount factor. By assuming that other elements of
the production function are constant in (3.7) for simplification, the dy-
namic budget constraint of infrastructure in per capita terms is subject
to:
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it ´ Cit (3.9)
where a dot over a variable denotes a time derivative. It is assumed
that the infrastructure capital stock is Gp0q “ 1 at the initial period.
The terminal condition is given as limtÑ8Gλe
´ρt “ 0, which indicates
that the infrastructure capital stock left over at the end of the planning
horizon is zero. In (3.9) we can observe that increases in the infrastruc-
ture capital stock (where τ ă τ˚) are equal to the total saving, which
in turn, is equal to the difference between output and consumption.
Hence, in this case the individual agent chooses depending on whether
the specificity you wish to indicate optimal consumption rCit : t ě 0s
and investment path to determine the level of infrastructure capital
stock rGit : t ě 1s. To find this optimal allocation of resources by the
individual agent, Nawaz et al. (2014) suggest to apply Hamiltonian










it ´ Cits (3.10)
In (3.10), the expression within the square brackets is equal to 9G
and λ is the Lagrange multiplier representing the present value of the
shadow price of income. Differentiation of the Lagrange function with
respect to Cit and Git yields the first order conditions
BH
BCit
“ 0 ñ e´ρt
C´σit
1´ σ
´ λ “ 0 (3.11)
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From (3.11) and (3.12) and fixing the infrastructure capital stock
Gp0q “ 0, the transversality condition equals limtÑ8Gitλe
´ρt “ 0.
Using the budget constraint in (3.9), the growth rate of per capita
consumption, which is the same as the growth rate of output and



































The outcome in (3.13) indicates that as institutional quality im-
proves, rent-seeking activities decrease. In our context, this implies
that high institutional quality enhances the productivity of infrastruc-
















showing that, as ηit increases, economic growth decreases if σ ą 0.
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After a logarithmic transformation, the model (3.14) is written as
9yit “ α ` θGit ` γIit ` σIit ˚Git, (3.16)
where 9yit denotes the GDP per capita growth rate for country i at
time period t, Iit represents an indicator of institutional quality, Git
stands for infrastructure capital, and Iit ˚ Git is the interaction term
between institutions and infrastructure.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the theoretical model discussed above
indicates that the higher ηit, the lower economic growth will be due to
less productivity of infrastructure capital and vice versa. The valida-
tion of the statement therefore specifies that when ηit “ 0 (in the case of









ρs higher than the economic growth under weak institutions 0 ă ηit ă
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3.6.2 Marginal Effect Figures
Figure 3.3: The effect of telephone infrastructure on the marginal effects of Polity2 on economic
growth. The graph is derived from the OLS regression results documented in in column 3 of Table
3.2.
Figure 3.4: The effect of electric power infrastructure on the marginal effects of Polity2 on
economic growth. The graph is derived from the OLS regression results documented in column 6
of Table 3.2.
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3.6.3 List of the countries
Table 3.8: List of countries
Code Country Code Country Code Country Code Country
1 Albania 31 Cyprus 61 Jordan 91 Philippines
2 Algeria 32 Denmark 62 Kenya 92 Portugal
3 Angola 33 Dominica 63 Korea, Rep. 93 Rwanda
4 Argentina 34 Dominican Republic 64 Lesotho 94 Samoa
5 Australia 35 Ecuador 65 Luxembourg 95 Saudi Arabia
6 Austria 36 Egypt, Arab Rep. 66 Madagascar 96 Senegal
7 Bangladesh 37 El Salvador 67 Malawi 67 Seychelles
8 Barbados 38 Ethiopia 68 Malaysia 98 Sierra Leone
9 Belgium 39 Fiji 69 Mali 99 Singapore
10 Belize 40 Finland 70 Malta 100 South Africa
11 Benin 41 France 71 Mauritania 101 Spain
12 Bolivia 42 Gabon 72 Mauritius 102 St. Lucia
13 Botswana 43 Gambia, The 73 Mexico 103 Sudan
14 Brazil 44 Germany 74 Mongolia 104 Suriname
15 Bulgaria 45 Ghana 75 Morocco 105 Swaziland
16 Burkina Faso 46 Greece 76 Mozambique 106 Sweden
17 Burundi 47 Grenada 77 Namibia 107 Switzerland
18 Cabo Verde 48 Guatemala 78 Nepal 108 Tanzania
19 Cameroon 49 Guinea-Bissau 79 Netherlands 109 Thailand
20 Canada 50 Guyana 80 New Zealand 100 Togo
21 Central African Republic 51 Honduras 81 Nicaragua 111 Tunisia
22 Chad 52 Iceland 82 Niger 112 Turkey
23 Chile 53 India 83 Nigeria 113 Uganda
24 China 54 Indonesia 84 Norway 104 United Kingdom
25 Colombia 55 Iran, Islamic Rep. 85 Oman 115 United States
26 Comoros 56 Ireland 86 Pakistan 116 Uruguay
27 Congo, Dem. Rep. 57 Israel 87 Panama 117 Vanuatu
28 Congo, Rep. 58 Italy 88 Papua New Guinea 118 Venezuela, RB
29 Costa Rica 59 Jamaica 89 Paraguay 119 Zambia
30 Cote d’Ivoire 60 Japan 90 Peru 120 Zimbabwe
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Overview. Migration contributes to the flow of goods, skills, knowl-
edge, information, ideas and financial capital. A rapidly growing body
of research examines the effect of migration on the social and eco-
nomic spheres of destination states and countries of origin. In this
chapter we study how migrants affect the political stability and in-
stitutional reforms of their home countries. Several possible factors
could explain/define the nature and direction of emigrant involvement
233
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determining the political stability and institutional qualities of their
homelands. In this context, we consider information transfer and cul-
tural diffusion channels. To this end, we use cross–sectional and panel
estimation techniques for a large sample of African countries as origin
and OECD countries as destination countries.
Keywords: migration; political stability; institutional quality
4.1 Introduction
It is important to note that this chapter aims to present ideas that are
part of the work-in-progress for this Ph.D thesis. Recent studies have
provided evidence on the impact of political conditions on international
migration (e.g., Clemens, 2017; Docquier et al., 2018; Shrestha, 2017).
Our findings in Chapter 2 also confirm that additional to economic
factors, political instability and weak institutional quality significantly
affect trends of international migration flow. It is noteworthy that
Africa, as one of the most civil–war–prone regions in the world, has
experienced mass migration within the continent and across the ocean
(Naudé, 2010; Lucas, 2014). Political tensions such as intrastate con-
flicts and terrorism, as well as human and political rights violations and
persecution on the grounds of nationality, ethnicity, religion, political
opinion or social group have forced African people to move abroad in
search of basic safety and security (Adepoju, 1995, 2008).
On the other hand, emigrants also play a pivotal role in the devel-
opment process of their home countries. However, less attention has
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been paid to how the political experiences of migrants spill over to their
home communities and affect the political behavior of those who stay
behind. The current study emphasizes the role of emigration in deter-
mining political stability and institutional qualities in their home coun-
tries, building on cross–country comparisons for a large set of African
countries over the last twenty-five years. Therefore, in this chapter we
look at the return impact of migrants on their home countries focusing
on political involvement relating to peacemaking and improving the
quality of institutions. Developing this idea further, we aim to inves-
tigate whether the negative relationship between emigration and civil
conflict and the positive relationship between emigration and institu-
tional reforms hold once we control for some essential variables that
determine conflicts and institutional quality.
In most cases, it is assumed that when people remain in exile for
a reasonable amount of time, they are exposed to new knowledge, ex-
perience, skills, ideas, information and institutions. In this regard, in-
ternational migration increases the probability that individuals change
their attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and political preferences. Hence,
living abroad as an immigrant is associated with a transformative ex-
perience (Barsbai et al., 2017). Indeed, the economic and political
atmosphere of the destination countries matters significantly for the
ability of migrants to participate in the development and institutional
building process of their countries of origin. However, economic devel-
opment participation or positive political engagement of the migrants
in their country of origin mainly depends on their competencies (Bau-
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dassé et al., 2018). Further, Chukwu-Emeka (2011) argues that the
involvement of migrants in development activities or in improving the
political trends of their home countries is shaped by their financial, in-
tellectual, political, cultural or social capital. In this regard, although
the biggest number of emigrants reside within Africa, significant num-
ber of Africans still immigrate to extra-continental destinations.1 We
assume that due to the relative political stability and effective institu-
tions of the developed countries, migrants absorb new political ideas,
norms, information and practices, which they then transfer to their
home communities.2 Such political spillovers, in turn have the po-
tential to transform political preferences, attitudes, and strategies by
strengthening the constituency for political change or promoting a cul-
ture of peace, especially in regions like Africa, where information ac-
quisition is difficult and costly (Barsbai et al., 2017).
There are several reasons why migrants may influence the politi-
cal tradition of their home countries. The literature discuss rationales
beyond purely ideological and philanthropic considerations to explain,
why migrants become involved in conflict prevention and enhance the
quality of institutions in their country of origin. In this regard, Bau-
dassé et al. (2018) lists a few arguments. First, migrants who intend
to return home for diverse reasons are mainly concerned with their
1Recent reports, for instance, United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs (2017) show who African emigrants who stayed within Africa and
those that moved outside the continent in 2017 were 53 percent and 47 percent,
respectively.
2In this case, we consider African immigrants that inhabit in the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.
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security and safety as well as with the quality of institutions. Partic-
ularly, entrepreneur and investor members of Diaspora who are very
keen to return home, need enabling environments, like political stabil-
ity and effective institutions, that safeguard their business and protect
them from any abuses. Second, the engagement of migrants in conflict
prevention and peacemaking, as well as their efforts towards institu-
tional improvement, are derived from concerns about their families and
friends being able to sustain themselves (Smith and Stares, 2007). In
relation to the second reason Baudassé et al. (2018) further argues that
due to the highly restrictive entry policies of developed countries, mi-
grants seek peace and effective institutions in their home countries as
they face difficulties in bringing their families. Finally, migrants could
be motivated to get involved in their countries’ political transforma-
tion based on their exposure to political stability and good institutional
quality in destination countries.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2
provides the empirical strategy and Section 4.3 presents open questions
and future research.
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4.2 Empirical Strategy
Employing a similar strategy to that used in Chapter 2, our analysis
is based on the distinction between the “exit and voice” dichotomy of
Hirschman (1970). In this chapter we particularly focus on the “voice”
option. Contrary to the conclusion that migration might weaken the
“voices” of emigrants proffered by Hirschman (1970), within the con-
text of the contemporary globalized world, characterized by cheap and
fast communication (including social media) and travel facilities, mi-
gration may no longer imply that emigrants lose their “voice” at home.
Our empirical objective is to investigate the effect of emigration
on political stability and the quality of institutions in countries of ori-
gin. For political stability, Pi,t, we use two indicators of conflicts, i.e.,
civil conflict incidence and civil war. In the same manner, we also use
several indicators of institutional quality, Ii,t, (including, democracy,
political rights, civil liberty, control of corruption, rule of law, govern-
ment stability, and bureaucratic quality), and measures of migration,
Mi,t, available for country of origin i “ 1, ...., N and year t “ 1, ...., T .
In our benchmark, we estimate annual flows of migration from African
country i to OECD destination country j at time t,
ř
jMij,t. Alterna-
tively, we regress migration stock from country i in OECD destination
country j at time t,
ř
j Sij,t.
In constructing our empirical model we consider political stability,
Pi,t, and the quality of institutions, Ii,t, as the dependent variables.
We augment the linear dynamic specification by adding the migra-
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HETEROGENEITY, MIGRATION, AND INSTITUTIONS 
Yitagesu Zewdu  Zergawu 
 
4.2. Empirical Strategy 239
tion flows or migration stocks to the set of explanatory variables. The
model is used in different approaches in the political stability litera-
ture (e.g., Reynal-Querol and Montalvo, 2005; Esteban et al., 2012;
Janus and Riera-Crichton, 2015; Giménez-Gómez and Zergawu, 2018)
and previous studies on institutional quality (Acemoglu et al., 2005;
Bobba and Coviello, 2007; Castelló-Climent, 2008; Spilimbergo, 2009;
Docquier et al., 2016).





i,t´1 ` εi,t (4.1)
where α is a constant. The lagged dependent variable enters the set
of explanatory variables with coefficient β to account for persistence in
political stability (or in institutional quality, in the other case).3 Our
coefficient of interest, γ captures the short-run effect of the migration
flows (or migration stock in the other case) on political stability (or
institutional quality) at the home country. Xki,t´1 is a vector of K ad-
ditional control variables (k “ 1, ....K). The vector δ includes param-
eters associated with the set of controls and captures their short-run
effects on political stability (or institutional quality). All explanatory
variables are lagged by one period.4 We use a set of controls X that
covers the major determinants of political stability and institutional
quality that are conventionally unidentified by the existing literature.
These control variables include GDP per capita, human capital, trade
3Similarly, in order to estimate the effect of emigration on institutions we use





4Note that in this case, one period represents five years.
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openness, net official development assistance as a share of GNI, ge-
ographic characteristics, ethnic polarization, ethnic fractionalization,
legal origin, and sub-regions.
In a multiple regression model, adding more explanatory variables is
problematic because of multicollinearity. For instance, GDP per capita
is undoubtedly highly correlated with human capital, and migration
itself is correlated with trade. For this reason, and in order to show
that our results are robust, we add one control (or set of controls) at
a time.
In growth models, the dynamic specification (4.1) has been com-
monly used to show the dynamics of persistent variables, such as GDP
per capita, and stock of human or physical capital. As Docquier et al.
(2016) explain, the predictor variables are persistent (for instance,
mi,t “ mi,ss, and Xi,t “ Xi,ss@t, where ss stands for steady state)
and if the coefficient of the lagged dependant variable is between 0 and
1 (i.e., β P r0; 1s), then the level of the dependent variable converges
towards a steady state level, which is given by (4.2)
Pi,t “
α ` γmi,ss ` δXi,ss
1´ β
(4.2)
which characterizes the long-run relationship between political sta-
bility (or institutions) and the right-hand side variables. In that case,
γ
1´β
, captures the long-run effect of emigration on the more desirable
political environment, i.e., political stability and democracy.
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4.3 Final remarks
Following the aforementioned empirical strategy, we employ various es-
timation techniques. While we estimate (4.1) using the panel dataset,
in order to estimate (4.2) we use a cross–sectional setting with one
observation per country. Indeed, we are conscious of econometric ad-
vantages and disadvantages in using the panel and cross–sectional set-
tings. In this regard, note that Docquier et al. (2016) summarize the
pros and cons of the panel and cross–sectional frameworks. In the
case of panel dataset, we can characterize the transitional dynamics of
political stability or institutional quality and better deal with unob-
served heterogeneity. However, we need to find exogenous instruments
that are both country–and time– specific. In a across–section frame-
work, on the other hand, the underlying steady–state assumption, al-
beit questionable, enables the difficulties inherent to the endogeneity
of the lagged dependent variable to be circumvented; however, in such
a framework the omitted variable issue is likely to be severe.
We estimate (4.1) and (4.2) using various estimation techniques.
In the first phase of our regression, we use OLS or pooled OLS tech-
niques. However, we are aware of the fact that such regression tech-
niques might generate serious econometric limitations. Particularly,
using cross-sectional or pooled OLS regressions might incur the endo-
geneity of our main variable of interest, the emigration flow or stock.
Therefore, in the second phase of our regressions, in order to overcome
the endogeneity problems (that relate to reverse causality and unob-
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served country characteristics) we use two strategies. First, we apply
the two-stage least squares p2SLSq estimation strategy. Accordingly,
we use appropriate instrumental variables pIV q. Then, to check the ro-
bustness of the IV strategy, we use the system–GMM estimator with
internal instruments. In the literature, system-GMM is commonly used
to account for unobservable heterogeneity and persistence in the lagged
dependent variables and other regressors (see, for instance, Bobba and
Coviello, 2007; Castelló-Climent, 2008; Docquier et al., 2016).
Using the data from the sources that are indicated in the previous
chapters, particularly in Chapter 2, we develop a dataset which is a five-
year balanced panel covering the period between 1990 and 2015, where
the initial year refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t “ 1990, t´ 1 “
1985). In this study, since we consider African countries, we focus on
entirely developing countries, and these sample countries are included
in the panel if they have a significant amount of data for each variables.
Our conjectures about the expected results are that emigration and
civil conflict or civil war are negatively correlated, while emigration and
institutional quality indicators are positively correlated. In doing so,
we assess the effect of emigration on political stability and institutional
quality using the OLS regression, relaying on both cross-sectional and
panel regression methods. Certainly, there are many identification is-
sues in using OLS and that needs to be addressed when looking at
the effect of emigration on political stability or institutions. Notably,
aspects of the direction bias between emigration and conflict or in-
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stitutions due to the reverse causality problem, as well as the omitted
variable bias leads to uncertainty in the findings. Hence, in order to ad-
dress these econometric shortcomings, we use the IV strategy. When
using the IV strategy, we follow two approaches. First, we use a grav-
ity model predicting a country’s migration flow or migration stock out
of the set of reasonably exogenous dyadic variables by interacting with
time dummies in the dynamic panel estimation. Second, we estimate
the effect of emigration on political stability and institutions with in-
ternal instruments using system–GMM regression. These estimation
techniques help us to overcome the econometric issues related to the
downward bias OLS estimations. Indeed, from the IV strategies we
also expect a negative correlation between emigration and conflict, as
well as a positive relationship between emigration and institutions.
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external engagement and human rights protection in the horn of
africa. Refugee Survey Quarterly 36 (4), 64–89.
Olson, M., 1993. Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American
Political Science Review 87 (3), 567–576.
Ongayo, A. O., 2008. Political instability in Africa: Where the
problem lies and alternative perspectives. Amsterdam: The
African Diaspora Policy Centre. Under: www. diasporacentre.
org/DOCS/Political Instabil. pdf (accessed October 15, 2009).
Ortega, F., Peri, G., 2009. The Causes and Effects of International
Migrations: Evidence from OECD Countries 1980-2005. Tech. rep.,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ortega, F., Peri, G., 2013. The Effect of Income and Immigration
Policies on International Migration. Migration Studies 1 (1), 47–74.
Østby, G., 2008. Polarization, horizontal inequalities and violent civil
conflict. Journal of Peace Research 45 (2), 143–162.
Ostrom, E., Schroeder, L., Wynne, S., et al., 1993. Institutional in-
centives and sustainable development: infrastructure policies in per-
spective. Westview Press.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HETEROGENEITY, MIGRATION, AND INSTITUTIONS 
Yitagesu Zewdu  Zergawu 
 
268 Bibliography
Palei, T., 2015. Assessing the impact of infrastructure on economic
growth and global competitiveness. Procedia Economics and Finance
23, 168–175.
Papyrakis, E., Raveh, O., 2014. An empirical analysis of a regional
Dutch Disease: the case of Canada. Environmental and Resource
Economics 58 (2), 179–198.
Park, J., 2015. Europes Migration Crisis. New York: Council of Foreign
Relations, 311–325.
Pettersson, T., Wallensteen, P., 2015. Armed conflicts, 1946–2014.
Journal of Peace Research 52 (4), 536–550.
Reynal-Querol, M., 2002. Ethnicity, political systems, and civil wars.
Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (1), 29–54.
Reynal-Querol, M., Montalvo, J. G., 2005. Ethnic polarization, poten-
tial conflict and civil war. The American Economic Review 95 (3),
796–816.
Rodrik, D., 2003. Institutions, integration, and geography: In search of
the deep determinants of economic growth. In Search of Prosperity:
Analytic Country Studies on Growth, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ.
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., Trebbi, F., 2004. Institutions rule: the
primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic
development. Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2), 131–165.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HETEROGENEITY, MIGRATION, AND INSTITUTIONS 
Yitagesu Zewdu  Zergawu 
 
Bibliography 269
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